Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1983

The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation
Charles J. Goetz
Robert E. Scott
Columbia Law School, rscott@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/399

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

69

SEPTEMBER

1983

NUMBER

6

THE MITIGATION PRINCIPLE: TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
Charles J. Goetz* and Robert E. Scott**

T

HE duty to mitigate is a universally accepted principle of contract law requiring that each party exert reasonable efforts to
minimize losses whenever intervening events impede contractual
objectives." Although applications of the mitigation principle pervade the specific rules of contract, 2 it is startling how many questions remain unanswered as to precisely what efforts the mitigation
duty requires and what point in time the obligation arises. For example, under what circumstances does mitigation require an in*Joseph
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** Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia.

We would like to thank Michael Dooley, Victor Goldberg, Stanley Henderson, John Jeffries, Saul Levmore, George Priest, Alan Schwartz, Paul Stephan, and the participants in
workshops at Stanford University, the University of Virginia, and the University of Toronto
for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
I Generations of legal commentators have observed that the term "duty" is misleading
because the contract breacher invokes the failure to mitigate as a defense to reduce the
damages for which he is otherwise liable rather than as an affirmative right of action. Thus,
the failure to mitigate merely "disables" the injured party from recovering avoidable losses.
See Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 P. 657 (1920); J. Crane, Cases on Damages 102 n.1
(1928); C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 128 (1935); Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1184 (1970). Nevertheless, because the term "duty" is both common and convenient, we will use it throughout this
article.
2 The doctrine of avoidable consequences, which precludes an injured party from recovering damages for losses which he reasonably could have avoided, is the centerpiece of the
mitigation principle. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27. Other manifestations of the
duty include rules that require an injured party to accept replacement performance as a
cure of defective tender or that require him to accept a substantial yet defective performance together with money damages. See infra text accompanying notes 73-81 (cure), 114-17
(substantial performance).
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jured party to deal with the contract breacher? Why does the duty
to minimize losses mature only after the breach, even if the injured
party became aware much earlier of a significant danger of breach
and had a cost-effective opportunity to mitigate the prospective
loss? Is the duty to communicate special or unforeseeable circumstances confined to the time of contracting, even where the communication of post-contract but pre-performance information
might reduce costs? These and many similar questions remain unresolved because the relationship among the diverse rules of mitigation has not been systematically articulated.3
Recognizing that each party's mitigation responsibility is inextricably linked to the performance obligation of his contracting partner is the key step in fitting the mitigation principle into a general
theory of contractual obligation. 4 In recent years, a maturing theoretical scholarship has furthered understanding of the performance
and remedial obligations of contracting parties. 5 By focusing on

3 Several scholars have examined the duty to mitigate as part of a more general analysis
of contractual performance and remedies. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 1183-99; Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules,
The UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 553 (1976);
Schmitthoff, The Duty to Mitigate, 1961 J. Bus. L. 361.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 14-17.
5 Recent theoretical scholarship on the behavior effects of contract rules has developed
from two distinct and largely unrelated analytic traditions. The first tradition has evolved
from the pioneering work on bargaining by Coase and others. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). These "bargain model" theorists have constructed
models of contracting behavior under conditions of low transaction costs to examine the
influence of different legal rules in environments where parties are able to allocate all relevant risks at the time of contracting. The major works in this tradition include Barton, The
Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal Stud. 277 (1972); Jackson,
"Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69
(1978); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1978); Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 960 (1978);
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz, Specific Performance]; Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The
Utility of Bargain, 16 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 543 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz,
Cure]; Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980). Our
own work with this analytic technique is Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises]; Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages];
Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 323
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particular performance problems, this scholarship has not only uncovered further questions but also heightened interest in a theoretical formulation that weaves the performance and remedial rules of
contract into a single fabric.
Part I of this article develops an analytic model of optimal mitigation as a further step toward a general theory of contractual obligation. The model answers two questions: First, what general formulation of a mitigation principle best addresses the broad
contractual goals of most parties? Second, what more specific rules
are required to implement this mitigation principle? The mitigation principle derived from the model requires each bargainer to
extend efforts to discover, share, and act on relevant information
so as to minimize the joint costs of providing performance or its
equivalent.
The major variable influencing the content of the specific rules
that reduce the mitigation principle to actual practice is the market for substitute performances. Thus, in Part II, we first test the
implications of our model in a transactional environment involving
a well-developed market for substitute performances. In such environments, the standard categorical contract norms governing contract performance and mitigation provide appropriate rules for
most bargainers. Indeed, the model clarifies a number of puzzles,
including the uncertain relationship between perfect tender and
cure," the reluctance to require injured parties to deal with

(1979) [hereinafter cited as Goetz & Scott, Sellers' Damages].
A parallel tradition has developed from theoretical models of industrial organization and
other complex relationships. These "transaction costs" theorists have focused on methods of
reducing transaction costs in complex contractual relationships. They assume that uncertainty and complexity often prevent parties from accurately allocating all relevant risks at
the time of contracting. This scholarship thus examines the strategies parties devise to encourage subsequent cooperation in such relational contracts. Principal contributions to this
literature include Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ. 426
(1976); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U.L. Rev. 854 (1978); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979). Our effort in this tradition is Goetz &
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts].
0 See infra text accompanying notes 69-81.
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breachers, 7 and the requirement that a clear and unequivocal repudiation precede any maturing duty to mitigate.8
In Part III, we consider the contrasting transactional environment of specialized contracts. There are peculiar problems affecting specialized contracts, especially those within a relational environment, that require different and more flexible rules., Although
a number of common-law rules, such as the doctrine of substantial
performance, respond in part to these special problems, the existing rules remain deficient in two respects. First, standard mitigation rules do not motivate optimal reduction of losses because
they are not sufficiently precise to fit particular Situations. Second,
the uncertain judicial treatment of provisions such as liquidated
damages agreements and bonuses limits the contracting parties'
ability to achieve unusual objectives through specially bargained
arrangements. 10
We argue that the traditional categorical rules of obligation and
mitigation are inadequate for niany classes of specialized contractors. Moreover, broad discretionary standards of behavior, such as
a general duty to use best efforts to mitigate, present acute enforcement difficulties in relational contexts. Individual bargainers,
therefore, should be granted wide latitude to devise customized
mechanisms to achieve their complex contractual objectives. We
suggest that the state might appropriately assist this process by
formulating a more complete and clearly defined menu of
preformulated contract clauses. Parties could then select alternative subsets of contractual rules to govern their specific situation,
choosing those best suited to the particular environment. In sum,
although the traditional general rules of contractual obligation
7See infra text accompanying notes 55-60.

* See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
Contracts are relational

to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obligations may be impractical
because of inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to
characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves
can be identified in advance.
Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1091.
10 The most significant cost of the common-law penalty doctrine results from its inducing
the "review of the entire continuum of cases where liquidated damages provisions are intended to reimburse true losses which are to any extent uncertain." Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 594.
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work well in contractual relationships in which there is a good
market for substitute performances, only more finely tuned norms
can accommodate the growing complexity of specialized
arrangements.

I. A

MODEL OF OPTIMAL MITIGATION

Most contract rules are permissive, applying only if the parties
do not otherwise agree. By providing standardized and widely suitable risk allocations in advance, the law enables most parties to
select a preformulated legal norm "off-the-rack," thus eliminating
the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed arrangement.""
Atypical parties remain free to bargain for customized provisions,
much as a person with an unusual physique may purchase customtailored garments for a premium rather than accept a standard size
and cut available at a lower price.1 2
Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by the state should
mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were they
costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction. 3 Using this
benchmark raises two separable issues: First, what arrangements
would most bargainers prefer? And, second, what atypical arrangements should be supported as benign alternatives?
The model developed in this article will show that the contractual obligee and obligor would agree in advance to minimize the
joint costs of adjusting to prospective contingencies, assigning the
responsibility of mitigating to whoever is better able to adjust to
the changed conditions. The occurrence of contingencies requiring
1 Contracting parties reduce costs by allocating particular risks to whichever one of them
has the comparative advantage in risk-bearing. Typically, each promisor bears the risk of his
own nonperformance because, between a promisor and promisee, the promisor is better
placed to reduce this risk. A promisor not only knows the factors affecting the cost of his
own performance, but he can also raise his level of precaution to reduce the risks affecting
performance. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 579-83.
12 Because the distinction between these two types of rules is so germane to much of our
discussion, we will classify them respectively as "preformulated" and "particularized" rules.
iS Assigning the dominant role in supplying preformulated contract rules to the state assumes that the state has some advantage over private parties. We defer any detailed discussion of the theoretical and factual bases for this assumption to a subsequent article. See
Goetz & Scott, A Supply Analysis of Private Law Rule Making (forthcoming 1983). Even if
we concede that the state has a comparative advantage in rule-making, however, the state
should incur the costs of supplying appropriate rules only if the benefits of contract-making
exceed its harms. See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 5.
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adjustment, however, may encourage strategic behavior by both
parties: the obligor may attempt to evade his performance responsibilities while the obligee may bargain opportunistically whenever
his cooperation is requested. Any effort legally to regulate one
manifestation of this strategic behavior almost inevitably exacerbates the other. But where a developed market for substitute performances exists, the potential for opportunism is negligible; parties can therefore focus on eliminating evasion of contractual
obligations without losing the benefits of cooperation. The tension
between performance and mitigation responsibilites is most keen
in situations lacking a good substitute market; parties in such environments must balance the costs of evasion and opportunism,
knowing that no single solution will eliminate the tension.
A.
1.

The Principle of Joint-Cost Minimization

The Readjustment Contingency

Formulating the ideal mitigation principle requires one first to
identify the kinds of costs contracting parties might want to reduce. The parties recognize many of the costs of promissory activity at the time of contracting and allocate these within the scope of
the defined contractual rights and obligations. For instance, they
may condition alternative modes of performance or excuse from
performance upon the occurrence of certain contingencies. It is one
thing, however, to perceive a risk in a manner sufficient to allocate
its consequences to one party or the other; it is quite another to
work out definitively the optimal responses to all future contingencies.1" As time passes and information increases, parties reassess
the risk associated with certain future contingencies. Such reassessments may follow a change in the probability of an event, the
magnitude of its consequences, or both. Inevitably, the party who
perceives an increase in prospective cost will regret the initial assignment of risks.
A regretting promisor will react to such a "readjustment contingency"1 5 by selecting the least costly of the following alternatives:
" See infra text accompanying notes 134-46.
15 The readjustment contingency is simply a more refined form of what we have previously called the "regret contingency": the future occurrence of an event or condition that
would motivate the promisor to breach the contract if breach were costless. Such an occurrence implies that either the promisor or promisee must bear a cost. See Goetz & Scott,
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(1) he may continue to pursue the original performance obligation
and absorb whatever loss results from his higher performance
costs; (2) he may breach and pay compensatory damages; or (3) he
may attempt, by renegotiation or otherwise, to modify the original
contract. Although a regretting promisor will naturally seek the
least costly alternative, interparty cooperation is frequently essential to minimize adjustment costs.1 6 In other words, both parties
may have to adjust in order to exploit fully the net benefits of
contracting.
Once a contract has been made, an obligee may seem to have
little interest in the obligor's excess costs. But a party who anticipates bearing excess costs will presumably negotiate for a more
costly return promise to compensate for those inflated costs. Because the terms acceptable to a risk-bearing obligor will reflect the
expected magnitude of his potential regret costs, both parties gain
if they agree in advance to provisions that will reduce expected
future costs.1 7 One can therefore derive a broad principle of mitigation by predicting how contractors would agree to cooperate if
charged explicitly with designing a policy to cope with readjustment contingencies. The resulting mitigation principle would require each contractor to extend whatever efforts in sharing information and undertaking subsequent adaptations that are necessary
to minimize the joint costs of all readjustment contingencies.
2. The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences and Its Related
Rules
The doctrine of avoidable consequences confirms this cost-minimizing conception of the mitigation principle, requiring a mitigator
to bear the risk of his failure to minimize losses. It denies a mitigator recovery for losses he unreasonably failed to avoid, but allows
him full recovery for costs incurred through any reasonable affirmative efforts to minimize losses.1 8 The courts seem implicitly to
Enforcing Promises, supra note 5, at 1273. The term "readjustment contingency" recognizes
that mutual cooperation can reduce the expected losses associated with some regret
contingencies.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 29-40.
17See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5.
19 The doctrine of avoidable consequences has both negative and affirmative aspects. The
affirmative branch of the doctrine permits recovery of all reasonable expenses that plaintiff
incurs in seeking to avoid damages. See, e.g., Rench v. Hayes Equip. Mfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865,
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have adopted a joint-cost minimization construction of "reasonable." ' In one illustrative case, breaching subcontractors argued
that the plaintiff prime contractor should have mitigated damages
by withdrawing from a building contract and forfeiting the one
percent bid bond.2 0 The court rejected their claim, reasoning that
"[t]he duty of the plaintiff to keep the damages as low as reasonably possible does not require of it that it disregard its own interests
[in maintaining good will] or exalt above them those of the defaulting defendants." 1 In other words, although the doctrine of
avoidable consequences requires a mitigator to minimize the joint
8 P.2d 346 (1932); Morrison v. Queen City Elec. Light & Power Co., 193 Mich. 604, 160
N.W. 434 (1916). Although the expenditures must be reasonable, the outlay itself establishes
a prima facie case. See, e.g., Hoehne Ditch Co. v. John Flood Ditch Co., 76 Colo. 500, 233 P.
167 (1925). Reasonable efforts include securing a substitute for a failed performance. See,
e.g., Elias v. Wright, 276 F. 908 (2d Cir. 1921); Gilliland v. Hawkins, 216 Ala. 97, 112 So. 454
(1927); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(2) (1979); U.C.C. §§ 2-704(2), 2-708, 2-710,
2-712, 2-715 (1978).
The negative branch of the doctrine precludes a plaintiff from passively incurring losses
which he could reasonably avoid or from actively increasing such losses where prudence
would require an adjustment. See C. McCormick, supra note 1, at 127-30. For example, a
plaintiff may not continue to perform services under a contract once the other party repudiates. See, e.g., Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); Craig v.
Higgins, 31 Wyo. 166, 224 P. 668 (1924); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) comment b, illustrations 1-5 (1979). In one frequently cited case, an employer wrongfully discharged an employee after learning of an outstanding judgment against him and disbelieving his claims of payment. The court denied the employee damages because he had failed to
show his employer proof of payment, a measure that might have reduced or avoided the
loss. Penna v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., 174 A.D. 436, 161 N.Y.S. 191 (1916). Courts frequently
apply this "inaction" branch of the doctrine to require substitute performance. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 comment c, illustrations 5, 7 (1979); U.C.C. §§ 2708(1), 2-713(1), 2-715(2)(a) (1978).
'9 C. McCormick, supra note 1, at 130-36. Common-law courts have developed several
rules of thumb to implement this reasonableness standard. First, they evaluate the available
mitigation strategies from the plaintiff's perspective at the time of breach and do not penalize him if he selected a reasonable strategy that proved retrospectively to be inferior. See
U.C.C. § 2-704(2) comment 2 (1978) (mitigator not penalized "unless ... the facts as they
appear at the time he learns of the breach [make] it clear that such action will result in a
material increase in damages") (emphasis added). Second, they apply an "equal advantage"
rule: a mitigator has no mitigation responsibility if the obligor could adjust as easily as the
mitigator could. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978)
(subcontractor not required to mitigate by contracting for substitute where supplier was in
as good a position to seek a supplemental supply as subcontractor).
:0 Frederick Raff Co. v. Murphy, 110 Conn. 234, 147 A. 709 (1929).
, Id. at 243, 147 A. at 712. See also Eastern Sportswear Co. v. S. Augstein & Co., 141
Conn. 420, 106 A.2d 476 (1954) (buyer's interest in selling quality clothing is justification for
refusing to accept and repair defective goods); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1970)
(no duty to enter into a partnership with hostile party).
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costs of breach, it does not require minimizing the defendant's loss
in a way that imposes a still greater loss on the mitigator himself.2
A number of related rules nevertheless appear to diverge from
the joint-cost minimization principle.2 For example, a breacher
can raise the failure to mitigate doctrine only as a defense to reduce his damages liability and not as an affirmative claim to protect his contract rights. 24 Furthermore, courts have refused to require potential mitigators to make cost-minimizing readjustments
prior to an unequivocal breach of the contract.2 5 Similarly, they
have tolerated cost-increasing refusals to deal with the contract
breacher e or refusals to make greater expenditures than the conJoint minimization of costs generally requires that a mitigator credit the breacher with
any new profits he obtains by virtue of the breach. See, e.g., McAleer v. McNally Pittsburg
Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1964) (wrongfully discharged employee is chargeable with
income he obtains from substitute employment); Bertholf v. Fisk, 182 Iowa 1308, 166 N.W.
713 (1918) (rule applies even though new employment is of a different kind); Cole v. City of
Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (same). Where a plaintiff can establish a
"lost volume" claim, however, the additional profits by resale or reemployment do not replace the breached contract because the transaction would have occurred even without the
breach. Thus, the mitigator need not credit the breacher with any such profits. For example,
in one case a distributor began successfully competing with his franchisor following the
franchisor's breach. The court rejected the franchisor's claim that the mitigation principle
required the distributor to offset his damages by the newly gained profits, reasoning that
the franchisor failed to prove the distributor could not have made the same profits even
without the contract breach. Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super.
437, 358 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1976). The validity of a "lost volume" claim depends entirely
on assumptions about the transactions plaintiff could profitably have undertaken had the
contract been performed and is doubtful whenever an available market exists for the seller's
goods or services. See Goetz & Scott, Seller's Damages, supra note 5, at 348-54.
2s See infra text accompanying notes 45, 50, 53, 55-59, 61, 69.
24 See supra note 1.
3'A plaintiff needs to extend efforts to avoid injurious consequences only when the advantage of adjustment is almost certain. He is not required to risk increases in uncompensated losses or experience the insecurity created by uncertainty. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Millican, 171 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1948); Standard Growers' Exch. v.
Hooks, 22 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1927). See also infra note 27.
Common-law courts have so extended the rule that the mitigation duty matures only at
the time of breach that no duty accrues at the time of anticipatory repudiation. See, e.g.,
Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), modified,
199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952) (affirmed timing of damages). See also infra text accompanying
notes 61-66.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (plaintiff seller entitled to recover difference between contract price and resale price despite refusal to accept defendant's offer to settle for amount greater than what plaintiff procured on
resale after breach), aff'd, 253 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1958); Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932) (buyer not required to accept substitute
offer from breaching sellers for molasses of different grade or price); Minneapolis Threshing
2
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tract contemplates." Can one explain these apparent departures
from the mitigation principle? The next section addresses this
question by suggesting how most contracting parties-if required
to develop rules to govern agreements-might choose norms and
exceptions that best reduce the theoretical mitigation principle to
actual practice.
B.

The Joint-Cost Minimization Principle in Actual Practice

1. Ideal Readjustment Responsibilities in a World of Perfect
Adjudication
Assume that two parties, Seller and Buyer, enter into an executory contract in which Seller agrees to supply for $250,000 an industrial air conditioning compressor for an office building that
Buyer is constructing. Assume further that no preformulated contract rules apply except as the contracting parties specifically
agree. The state merely offers standard norms of performance-perfect tender, substantial performance, etc.-and various
remedial options as a menu of terms from which contracting parties must make individual selections. In this environment, contractors themselves choose the legal rules that will regulate their prospective relationship and the legal system will enforce whatever
agreement is reached. Because this model is designed to predict
the rules most bargainers would select, assume also that neither
Seller nor Buyer has any unusual preference for risk or strategic
behavior. Finally, to understand the task confronting parties who
attempt to create an ideal system of contractual obligations, as-

Mach. Co. v. McDonald, 10 N.D. 408, 87 N.W. 993 (1901) (seller not required to take goods
on terms offering less security for payment, even though price is higher than alternatives).
See also infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
2 Courts often state this rule in stronger terms: a plaintiff is not required to incur unusual or disproportionate expense in attempting to avoid damages. See, e.g., Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Cobb, Christy & Co., 64 Ill.
128 (1872) (plaintiff buyer not required to invest more
money in buying other corn to perform resale contract where carrier's delay prevented its
performance); Hauldand v. Muirhead, 233 Mich. 390, 399, 206 N.W. 549, 552 (1925) ("[I]t
was not the duty of plaintiffs to hazard the payment of money upon such uncertainties in an
attempt to minimize a loss to them . . ...
"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1)

comment g (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. On the other hand, where a
plaintiff can reduce a large loss by expending a small amount of money but fails to do so, he
may not recover the resulting damages. See, e.g., Sargent v. North End Water Co., 190 Cal.
512, 213 P. 33 (1923).
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sume initially that both Seller and Buyer can instantly and
costlessly enforce the rules of behavior.
Under such conditions, Buyer and Seller could easily separate
the liability implied by risk-bearing from the conduct required for
least-cost adjustment. For example, suppose that shortly after the
parties conclude their contract a labor strike against the principal
manufacturer causes the price of industrial compressors to rise to
$300,000. Seller, bound by the contract to supply a compressor for
$250,000, now faces a possible loss of $50,000. Although the contractual obligation requires Seller to bear the cost of a price increase, it does nothing to encourage behavioral adjustments that
minimize Seller's loss. Nonetheless, in a perfect adjudication environment, the parties could assign the adjustment responsibilities
after the performance obligations were allocated. Whichever party
could better adapt to the readjustment contingency would accept
the obligation to do so, although the resultant expense would still
be chargeable to the primary bearer of the risk in question. For
example, if Buyer can adjust to the price increase at a lower cost
than Seller-perhaps by purchasing substitutes, amending specifications, or taking some other action-Seller obviously would prefer
to pay Buyer to adjust rather than bear his own higher costs.
2.

The Problem of Evasion in Defining ContractualObligations

In the real world of costly and time-consuming adjudication,
however, neither the performance nor the readjustment responsibilities can be established and enforced except through imperfect
rules that reflect a compromise among conflicting concerns. Moreover, the parties to an executory contract are compensated in advance in the form of premiums and discounts 8 to bear any future
costs that may arise. Tensions result when conditions such as the
price of compressors change unexpectedly, giving the adversely affected party a strong incentive to chisel on his performance obligation by denying that the contract assigned the particular risk to
him. He may chisel by contesting facts, exploiting arguably ambiguous terms, or refusing to provide full compensation upon breach.
Such attempts to escape performance obligations, together with

" See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis for the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487, 491-93 (1980).
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the other party's efforts to counteract them, create what we shall
call evasion costs.
Attempts to evade are, in essence, a method of coercively redefining the performance obligations-of imposing a "new" and more
favorable contract on the nonbreacher. Even without legal rules to
restrain evasion, however, this behavior is not necessarily costless
to the evader. The injured party may retaliate or the evader may
damage his commercial reputation. Although the motive to chisel
on performance obligations is in principle always present, counterbalancing costs will usually restrain actual attempts to do so. Nevertheless, the same contingencies that trigger readjustments may
increase the benefits of evasion above the costs.2 9 Because extralegal sanctions will not always deter evasion sufficiently, parties will
want to bind themselves to legally enforceable obligations.
Contracting parties could design an unambiguous, categorical assignment of performance responsibilities if reduction of evasion
opportunities were the sole concern. An unconditional right of specific performance, for example, would place the full burden of any
readjustment contingency, both as to cost and conduct, on the
party whose performance was affected by the contingency. Such an
arrangement would not only reduce evasion otherwise possible because of ambiguity, but also eliminate the risk that costly mitigation efforts might not be fully reimbursed. Despite its efficacy in
reducing evasion, however, it is not. clear that contractual parties
would actually find such an arrangement advantageous. A contract
that relies solely on readjustments by a single contractor will generate substantial costs if the parties lack incentives to readjust cooperatively to subsequent events. To determine the most suitable
legal rules, the parties must therefore balance reduction of evasion
against the potential costs of relying solely on "autonomous"
readjustments."°
3.

The Costs of Autonomous Readjustments
Autonomous readjustments by the obligor will fail to minimize

29 See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89 J. Pol. Econ. 615, 618-25 (1981); Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963).
30 "Autonomous" readjustments comprise any actions that are within the sole control of a
single contractor.
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joint costs because the obligee has inadequate incentives to cooperate in reducing costs. The problem of noncooperation has two components: First, it distorts the obligor's choice among the three readjustment options; and, second, it deprives the obligor of
information concerning the parties' relative abilities to adjust.
a. The Effects of Noncooperation on the Readjustment Choice
In analyzing the choice among the three avenues of readjustment
previously identified-performance at higher cost, contract breach,
and contract modification 3 1-one should bear in mind that the
first two options are theoretically equivalent ways to "satisfy" the
contract. Indeed, breach together with payment of fully compensatory damages is properly regarded as alternative performance or
"quasi-performance. 3 2 To determine how a regretting obligor
might choose between performance and quasi-performance, assume
in our model that Seller has the necessary information to recognize
the intervening contingency (the labor strike) and to assess his
available options. Once he recognizes the conditions likely to produce a price increase, he can always make cost-minimizing adjustments himself. For example, Seller can safeguard his supply of
materials needed for performance by taking early delivery of a conforming compressor or by securing options to buy from alternative
sources. Such an autonomous readjustment would preserve the option of fulfilling the original performance obligation regardless of
any increased costs.
There may be circumstances, however, in which the obligee can
more advantageously make all or part of the adjustment. For example, Buyer may be able to install adjustable windows, use temporary air conditioning units, or even delay occupancy until the
strike is settled. Seller would be foolish under such circumstances
to adjust autonomously; that would not be the cheapest way to satisfy his performance obligation. 3 Seller would instead prefer that
S1

See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.

32

We will specifically indicate when we wish to distinguish nonsatisfactory breach

(breach accompanied by insufficient compensatory damages) from satisfactory breach (sufficient damages). When we refer to breach without supplying a distinguishing adjective, we

mean satisfactory breach.
33 Although the obligor is likely to have the advantage in readjustments that minimize the
cost of his own performance, it is equally plausible that the obligee will have the advantage
in planning his own affairs so that the consequences of nonperformance are appropriately
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Buyer readjust, even though Seller will have to bear the resulting
expense. One can characterize an obligor's decision to breach,
therefore, as an election to surrender irrevocably his option to perform '3 4-a request that the obligee bear all future adjustment costs,
with damages provided as reimbursement. Breach is the obligor's
signal that: "My assessment of our relative capacities suggests that
you enjoy the comparative advantage on all prospective adjustments. Therefore, please undertake all cost-minimizing adjustments and send me the bill." In essence, breach involves a final
commitment to quasi-performance (breach with damages) as the
most efficient means of satisfying the original contractual
obligation.
Although an obligee cannot prevent an obligor from electing to
breach, the choice of breach itself is not really a fully autonomous
adjustment because the obligee frequently exercises considerable
control over the way in which quasi-performance is effectuated.
For example, the obligee controls the acquisition of "cover," the
use of substitutes, and the timing of reactions. Absent mitigation
rules, an obligee's indifference to making cost-effective adaptations
may powerfully affect the cost of the breach option. This is a classic case of "moral hazard": the party whose rights are "insured" by
the performance obligation is unwilling to adopt precautions that
benefit the insuror.
Even if the probability of breach is quite low, as long as the decision to perform or breach is still under consideration, the nonbreacher retains considerable influence over the costs of autonomous readjustment. An obligor is always interested in satisfying
his contractual obligation as cheaply as possible; he has no a priori
preference for performance or for quasi-performance. Because an
obligor may closely weigh the relative advantage of each of his options during the period before the obligation matures, a nonbreacher can distort an obligor's choice among all three readjustment alternatives 5 by increasing the expected cost of quasiperformance. In short, because the nonbreacher lacks incentives to

minimized. Hence, if autonomous readjustments were the exclusive means of reacting to
contingencies, the costs of satisfying contracts would in many cases be inflated.
" Breach may be a rather blunt method of readjustment; not only does the breacher
irrevocably abandon performance as a means of contractual satisfaction, he also loses the
obligee's return performance. See infra p. 983.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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cooperate in minimizing losses, autonomous readjustments by an
obligor will generate excessive costs.
b. The Effects of Asymmetric Information on Autonomous
Readjustment
If an obligor does not have sufficient information to recognize
and evaluate the possibilities for readjustment, the distortion is
even worse. His misinformation will cause him to over or underestimate the costs of quasi-performance and "invest" inefficiently in
conduct affecting the relative probabilities of performance or
breach. If Seller underevaluates the consequences of breach, and
hence his compensatory damages liability, he will underinvest in
"safeguard" behavior that would otherwise increase the likelihood
of.successful performance. An informational error in the opposite
direction will result, of course, in an overinvestment in safeguard
behavior and an inefficient reluctance to accept a risk of breach.
Requiring an obligee to convey information to the obligor will
reduce the potential distortion of the obligor's adjustment choices.
Optimal adjustment may also require an obligor to convey information to the obligee. Even if an obligee is perfectly willing to
adopt mitigating adjustments, he may not be able to assess the
available options without such crucial information as the obligor's
estimated probability of nonperformance. Little can be done to
remedy "invincible ignorance," a situation in which no one has access to the information necessary to recognize a cost-effective adjustment. But when one party does have access to information necessary for the other's cost-effective adjustment, the communication
of that information should be ensured.
The problem of encouraging parties to share information is
really just a special case of the problem of noncooperation just discussed:3 6 because an obligee has no interest ex post in reducing obligor's costs, he has little incentive to convey helpful information.
An obligee's failure to communicate information to the obligor is
especially wasteful because it prevents the obligor from exploiting
even those adjustments that, if perceived, would be under the obligor's autonomous control. In our hypothetical case, Buyer might be
satisfied by a second-hand, refurbished compressor and Seller

31 See supra p. 980.

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 69:967

might be able to supply one cheaply. But Seller loses this efficient
readjustment opportunity if Buyer fails to disclose the acceptability of the substitute performance.
3.

The Problem of Opportunism in Renegotiation

Parties are not limited to autonomous readjustments. If mutual
cooperation is necessary to minimize costs, such cooperation can be
37
achieved consensually through the third option of renegotiation.
By renegotiation, the parties can reallocate the rights and duties
which have become inefficient because of intervening events. For
example, Buyer could agree to delay his occupancy until the strike
is settled. Seller would thus solicit Buyer's cooperation in making
adjustments Seller could not achieve alone. The maximum payment Seller will offer Buyer is the difference between Seller's position with and without Buyer's cooperation.
Renegotiation, however, creates a moral hazard in addition to
the obligee's indifference: the obligee may actually threaten to exacerbate damages unless the obligor purchases his cooperation at a
premium. For instance, Buyer might .engage in opportunistic behavior to extract the full "value" of his cooperation in adjusting to
the strike.3 8 He could accomplish this goal by foot-dragging, by inflating the estimates of mitigation costs, or by manifesting any
other sign of reluctance to cooperate. Of course, Seller has analogous motives to induce Buyer's cooperation at minimum cost, perhaps by exploiting the potential for evasion as an implicit or explicit threat.
Would strategic behavior affect renegotiations more than original negotiations? Although both situations involve carving up gains
from trade, renegotiations will provoke more costly strategies if
parties have become "contractually specialized" and face substantially restricted alternate arrangements. At best, renegotiations impose significant transaction costs on the parties. Especially when
opportunism magnifies them, renegotiation costs tend to impede

See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
Williamson defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile." See Williamson,
supra note 5, at 234 n.3. Such strategic behavior includes "bluffs, threats, and games of
'chicken' designed to exploit another party's presumed bargaining disadvantage." Goetz &
Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1101 n.26. See also Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521 (1981).
37
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readjustments that offer potential benefits for both parties. Parties
will hesitate to trade information necessary for readjustments if
bargaining over such transfers may itself alert the potential buyer
to all or part of the very information that one might wish to "sell."
Moreover, even when the parties ultimately achieve cooperative readjustment, the associated renegotiation costs remain a deadweight loss reducing the potential benefits of the contractual
relationship.
4. The Tension Between Performance Obligations and a Duty to
Mitigate
Contracting parties could reduce renegotiation costs by agreeing
in advance to a detailed set of alternative rights and duties conditioned upon varying future circumstances. Attempts to provide
built-in readjustment within the terms of the original obligation,
however, confront a number of serious problems. Increasing the
complexity of the obligational definition not only facilitates evasion, but also exposes a party to what we shall call the "breacherstatus" problem of contract law. A party who contests the interpretation of his obligation by withholding any part of the disputed
performance risks being characterized as a breacher. Obviously, the
status of breacher is disadvantageous because the breacher is liable
for compensatory damages. Frequently overlooked, however, is the
breacher's loss of an accrued interest in what may be extremely
valuable return rights.
For instance, if our Seller withholds performance based on a
plausible claim of excuse due to the labor-caused price increases,
he still risks being assigned breacher status by a court. Unlike a
deliberate choice of breach, however, this classification does not
imply that the consequences of breach were superior to those of
performance. Indeed, a court-labeled breacher will frequently view
his course of action in retrospect as a serious error. Moreover, a
court will assign the burden of interpretation errors exclusively to
the first party making a mistake; there is only one breacher and he
frequently loses the entire benefit of his bargain.
The breacher-status problem gives parties an additional incentive to select clear, definitive rules of obligation to safeguard the
initial allocation of contractual rights. Clear rules of obligation,
however, are potentially incompatible with a sufficiently adaptive
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set of mitigation responsibilities. 9 The parties can reduce both error costs (from insufficient readjustment) and renegotiation costs
only by prescribing a more detailed statement of shared responsibilities. Unfortunately, that advantage necessarily accrues at the
cost of increased difficultly in enforcing original obligations. 0
5.

The Influence of a Market for Substitute Performances

The existence of a market for substitute performance permits
parties to reduce the tension between clear performance standards
and mitigation responsibilities. Where markets for numerous and
close substitute performances exist, the advantages of clear, categorical rules of performance tend to dominate the advantages of
elaborate readjustment responsibilities. Such markets eliminate
much of the need for mitigation rules because the parties can often
make optimal adjustments autonomously by, in essence, purchasing them from the lowest bidder in the marketplace.
In our illustrative case, assume that Seller and Buyer are equally
capable of covering by purchasing a substitute compressor on the
spot market at the contract price plus the $50,000 premium added
by the strike. The market offers both parties the opportunity to
readjust autonomously, fixing the cost of doing so at $50,000. Because Seller's access to substitute performance serves as a realistic
and effective limit on excessively costly readjustment and renegotiation, the parties can focus on minimizing the difficulties of defming and enforcing the original obligation rather than on mitigation.
Where a specialized market provides fewer substitutes, the strategies for cost-minimization become more varied. As the market for
substitute performances thins, the opportunity cost of an alternative performance increases for both parties and the bargaining
range is correspondingly expanded. In such an environment, an obligor becomes more vulnerable to an obligee's refusal to readjust.41
For example, if Seller's additional performance costs amount to
$80,000, Buyer may demand a $75,000 premium to readjust even

'o

See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.

40 See id.

41 A well-developed market would reduce both uncertainty and a mitigator's opportunistic behavior by providing an objective measurement of the costs of alternative performances.
As the market for substitute performances thins, however, the difference between a mitigator's adjustment costs and the obligor's autonomous adjustment alternatives expands.
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though he may be able to place himself in an equivalent position
for $50,000. Buyer, on the other hand, can "sell" his mitigation advantage only to Seller, who may resist paying any premium. The
absence of accurate information on the objective "value" of
Buyer's readjustment capacity exacerbates this mutual dependence. Both the dependence and informational factors tend to spur
opportunism as market accessibility diminishes. 2
In this more complex environment, therefore, parties must balance the potential evasion and opportunism costs in structuring
obligation and mitigation rules. One approach to balancing these
costs is to establish a general standard of obligation and mitigation
responsibilites such as a "best efforts" or a fiduciary obligation.
Ideally, such an inclusive norm will reduce substantially the opportunities for strategic behavior, thus counterbalancing the increased
difficulty of determining liability under a general standard of responsibility. Another approach is to design narrower "rules of
thumb" which require mitigation in predetermined circumstances.
The doctrine of substantial performance in construction contracts,
for example, requires the nonbreacher to mitigate by accepting a
deficient performance coupled with money damages. Rules of
thumb preserve some of the clarity of a market-influenced rule
structure, yet they soften the impact of the conventional breachernonbreacher distinction. 4 No single solution, however, will fully
resolve the dilemma of conflicting performance and mitigation

42 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297, 298-302 (1978). Strategic moves also
produce inefficient overinvestments in counterprecautions. Id. See also Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1100-1101 & 1101 n.25 (discussing responses to strategic

behavior and noting that investment will be determined by the parties' perceptions of their
next best opportunity).
43 Although a party tendering a substantial but deficient performance has breached his
contract, he does not lose all his accrued contractual rights. Instead, the injured party must
mitigate by accepting a species of quasi-performance-substantial performance plus a monetary allowance-and supply the breacher his return performance. See infra text accompa-

nying notes 114-17. By defining narrowly both performance and mitigation responsibilities,
however, the substantial performance rule may not be suitable for all contractors. Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb it warns atypical parties to bargain explicitly for customized arrangements of risk and responsibilities to protect fully their contractual expectations. For
example, atypical parties may agree to a bonus payment arrangement in which the mitigator
pays a premium to exempt himself from a readjustment duty. Alternatively, a liquidated

damages or penalty clause might require an obligor to pay the mitigator a premium as additional "insurance" against nonperformance.
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goals. More specialized transacting environments simply require
more varied and complex strategies to encourage optimal contractual behavior than do market environments.
II.

MITIGATION IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET

Many of the categorical rules governing contractual obligations
seem incompatible with the broad principle of mitigation embodied in the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 44 Our model, however, suggests that, in a market with many and close substitute
performances, most parties might indeed prefer clear, categorical
rules of obligation together with only narrowly drawn mitigation
responsibilities. Part II thus examines whether the categorical
common-law rules can be explained and rationalized as manifestations of this rulemaking strategy.
A.

The Objective Compensation Principle

The objective compensation principle limits damages from
breach to the "amount of money that can be obtained in exchange
for [the promised performance] in some market.' '45 For example,
assume that a highly developed market exists for air conditioning
compressors conforming to the specifications in the contract between our hypothetical Buyer and Seller. Although labor unrest results in an increase of the spot price by $50,000, either party can
purchase a conforming compressor at that premium. The $50,000
objective market value will limit Buyer's damages unless he has
revealed any unusual circumstances or idiosyncratic preferences at
the time of contracting. Even where standard exchange values are
concededly inadequate, the objective compensation principle excludes any "fanciful" or unusual losses on the grounds that such
losses are either speculative or unforeseeable. 46 Limitations on
damage recovery encourage the parties to share information about
contingencies that would potentially exacerbate the consequences
of a breach. 47 In turn, they permit an obligor to value correctly the
activities which increase the probability of his performance.
" See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.

45 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1022 (1964).
6 See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 573 n.53.
47 This limitation on damages has two components. The first is the consequential damages rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Denying damages for
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The most striking aspect of the objective compensation principle
is its temporal limitation: each party's responsibility for the consequences of breach embraces only those needs and circumstances
known at the time of contracting. e For example, an obligor may
discover just prior to performance that breach will cause previously
unforeseeable losses to the obligee. Yet an obligor will suffer no
legal sanction if he fails to warn the unsuspecting obligee to renegotiate for protection against the originally unforeseen losses.
Refusing to recognize any responsibility to share subsequently
acquired information seems inconsistent with the mitigation principle. In the competitive market, however, the parties will tend to
share all relevant information even without a legally imposed mitigation responsibility. Because the contract performance is readily

the unascertainable consequences of breach induces an obligee to disclose information that
the obligor may not have possessed concerning future circumstances. Such a rule is consistent with a cost-minimizing strategy because unusual circumstances otherwise cause the obligee to misperceive the value of activities that enhance the probability of performance.
In addition to unforeseeable consequences, the objective damages rule also limits the recovery of idiosyncratic values. Thus the rule serves as a signal to the atypical or idiosyncratic bargainer who values the performance intrinsically more than the market to communicate these specialized concerns at the time of contracting. Once again, the cost-minimizing
criterion justifies the limiting rule. Most bargainers, not having idiosyncratic preferences,
would not be willing to purchase the extra "insurance" to protect special value. The idiosyncratic bargainer is thus encouraged to negotiate in advance for any additional performance
insurance at the time of contracting.
" U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1978) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know .

. . .")

(emphasis added). The

Hadley v. Baxendale time of contracting limitation is justified by an obligor's need to calculate allocated risks ex ante in evaluating terms and attractiveness of the contract. Without
such a rule, the injured party has an incentive to withhold disclosure of the unusual consequences of nonperformance until after the contract price is negotiated. Knowledge of special
circumstances raises the price obligor demands to bear the added risk.
Courts may, however, sometimes hold the obligor responsible for subsequently learned
consequences. See, e.g., Virginia-Carolina Peanut Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 155 N.C.
121, 71 S.E. 71 (1911) (carrier liable for delay-caused damages, even though unaware at time
of contracting of need for prompt delivery, because he was so warned before delay occurred); Conn v. Texas & N.O. Ry., 14 S.W.2d 1004 (Tex. App. Comm'n) (carrier liable for
damages for negligent failure to deliver feed after special circumstances communicated
while collecting freight charges), aff'd, 14 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. 1929); Bourland v. Choctaw, 0.
& G. Ry., 99 Tex. 407, 90 S.W. 483 (1906) (notice of urgency of prompt delivery of feed
given at time of arrival sufficient to hold carrier for consequential losses to cattle following
delayed delivery).
Although the Hadley rule is suitable for contractors who either know or can ascertain
information necessary to reduce risks at the time of contracting, it becomes less so in relational or other specialized contexts characterized by uncertainty and complexity.
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marketable by either party, there is no motivation for strategic renegotiation; the parties will "sell" discovered information at market value. In sum, where the market removes the threat of opportunism, renegotiation is an acceptable response to any
readjustment contingency.
It is tempting to argue that, if such limited mitigation responsibilities are desirable in a market environment, then the remedy of
specific performance should be preferred over objectively valued
damages. An unqualified right to specific performance, after all,
appears to offer special advantages in reducing the risk of evasion.
It is precisely in this limiting case of close market substitutes, however, that the standard compensatory damages are as effective in
restraining evasion and guaranteeing satisfaction of the original
obligation as specific performance. Specific performance provides
no additional security against a nonsatisfactory breach. The distinction between the two remedies therefore reduces to whether
the obligee receives performance from his original obligor or acquires a perfectly fungible performance on the market with the obligor's damage payment. The distinction between specific performance and damages is only relevant when market alternatives do not
provide good substitutes for original performance.4 9
49 See Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351 (1978); Schwartz, Specific
Performance, supra note 5. Kronman defends the common-law limitations on specific performance by arguing that parties would not agree ex ante to a specific performance remedy
where substitute performances are ordinarily available. In such markets, obligors would retain the choice of breach with damages in order to accept better offers, while obligees would
be satisfied with money damages. If specific performance were routinely awarded in such
markets, he concludes, parties would engage in costly renegotiations to buy out of the specific remedy. Kronman, supra, at 265-69.
Schwartz, on the other hand, demonstrates that the conventional objections to specific
performance as a general remedy prove invalid in competitive markets. In such markets,
parties can anticipate fluctuations in future prices which are reflected in the ruling market
price. Thus, contracting parties would be less concerned ex ante about specific performance
in competitive markets than in specialized markets where specific performance is generally
available. Schwartz also argues that a buy-out of a specific performance remedy never actually requires costly renegotiations. Any seller preferring alternative uses of resources can
adjust autonomously in a competitive market by acquiring a substitute and tendering the
contract performance. Because the presumed inefficiencies of the remedy are nonexistent,
and because it fosters full compensation for breach, he concludes that specific performance
should routinely be available as a preformulated rule. Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra
note 5, at 274-78, 279-91.
Although we agree with Schwartz that specific performance does not impose excess renegotiation costs when available in a market environment, our analysis suggests that, in a welldeveloped market for substitutes, specific performance has no peculiar benefits either. A

1983]

Mitigation Principle
B. Anticipatory Breach and Avoidable Consequences

1. Conduct Constituting a Repudiation: The Problem of PreBreach Mitigation
Common-law courts have consistently held that a plaintiff need
not take steps to avoid losses so long as the defendant has not
clearly and definitively repudiated the contract.50 Imagine, for example, that the hypothetical air conditioning contract was negotiated on April 1 with a delivery date of September 15. On May 1,
Seller telegraphed Buyer stating: "In trouble on April 1 contract
owing to unanticipated difficulties in acquiring necessary compressor. Don't see how we could deliver without price adjustment."
The market price on May 1 was $10,000 over the contract price.
On August 1, after the market price had risen another $20,000,
Buyer telephoned Seller for clarification. Seller then replied, "We
haven't attempted to secure a compressor nor do we plan to."
Buyer shortly thereafter sued Seller for $30,000 in damages based
on the difference between the contract price and the August 1
market price. Seller now contests the damages claim, arguing that
the anticipated performance difficulties were promptly communicated on May 1 and that a properly mitigating buyer would have
undertaken precautionary adjustments at that time. Because
Seller's equivocal actions would not constitute breach under the
common law, however, his telegram on May 1 did not trigger any
categorical compensatory damages rule is as readily enforceable and presents no greater
risks of measurement inaccuracies because market values can be easily established. As the
market thins, however, the choice between specific performance and breach with damages
become more important. Specific performance effectively restrains evasion (efforts to exploit ambiguity as well as to effect nonsatisfactory breach), but correspondingly increases
renegotiation costs because of the mitigator's strategic advantage. See infra text accompanying notes 89-97.
so See, e.g., Watts v. Camors, 115 U.S. 353 (1885) (not necessary to find a new charterer of
vessel as long as renegotiations are continuing); Southern Nat'l Bank v. TRI Fin. Corp., 317
F. Supp. 1173, 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970) ("Defendant had neither breached nor indicated an
intention so to do; having not yet been injured by any breach of defendant's, plaintiff had
no damages to mitigate."), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 458 F.2d 688
(5th Cir. 1972); Sunset Shingle Co. v. Northwest Elec. & Water Works, 118 Wash. 416, 203
P. 978 (1922) (not necessary for plaintiff to seek substitute following defendant's failure to
furnish electric power as agreed so long as defendant did not definitively repudiate the contract). Courts continue to apply the common-law rule that repudiation must be clear and
unequivocal, and repudiation under the UCC similarly requires either a reasonable indication of rejection of the continuing obligation or an action rendering performance impossible.
U.C.C. § 2-610 comments 1-2 (1978).
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mitigation responsibility. Buyer can continue to rely completely on
Seller's promise, as though the significant new information had not
arisen.51
Although optimal mitigation would seem to require Buyer to adjust to the newly perceived circumstances, the existence of a competitive market largely explains why Buyer does not have to mitigate. Access to a market of substitute transactions enables Seller to
readjust autonomously by purchasing conforming goods-perhaps
on May 1-and then supplying them to Buyer when due. Because
Buyer's relative advantage in mitigating will usually be modest in a
market environment, a clear repudiation rule limits the breacher's
ability to evade, but has little or no negative impact on the efficiency of readjustment itself. Most parties would presumably prefer such a rule to one that is more sensitive but also more difficult
to apply.
In short, an injured party's mitigation responsibility matures
only upon receipt of a clear signal of breach, thus preventing a
breaching obligor from contending that the injured party should
have adjusted earlier. Requiring a clear, unequivocal repudiation
also reduces the risk of inadvertent breaches resulting from disputed interpretations of the performance obligations.
2. Nonsatisfactory Breach and Insecurity
Notwithstanding its benefits, the common-law requirement of
clear and unequivocal evidence of repudiation does increase the
loss exposure from nonsatisfactory breaches. 2 In particular, the
risk of incurring breacher status discourages a party from taking
precautions to guard against potential undercompensation in the
event of breach. For example, suppose that an obligor anticipated
breach and, concerned about payment, suspended his own performance as "security" against possible nonpayment. If he guessed
incorrectly, the suspension would itself constitute a breach of
contract.
5, Restatement of Contracts § 336(1) comment a (1932) ("In general, however, it is reasonable for the plaintiff to rely upon the defendant to perform as he has promised."). Note,
however, that the parallel comment of the Second Restatement does not repeat this language. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 comment b (1979) (once party has reason to
know performance will not be forthcoming, he is ordinarily expected to stop his own performance to avoid further expense).
52 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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The insecure party's dilemma is best understood by viewing
breach as a request for a loan equal to the amount of the ultimate
damage bill as well as for mitigating readjustments. The amount of
this potential loan is difficult to calculate at the time of contracting because the risks of nonpayment, as well as the costs of
credit, are not known until the obligor actually requests readjustment. Although the parties are free to specify prejudgment interest
in most jurisdictions, the appropriate credit rate, including risk
premium, cannot be determined accurately until the circumstances
of the loan are known.
Addressing the problem of nonsatisfactory breach, section 2-609
of the Uniform Commercial Code 53 authorizes the insecure party to
demand assurances of "performance" once the need for readjustment arises, thus clarifying the obligor's ambiguous behavior. The
assurance demand asks, "Are you going to breach or not? And
' 54
what are the credit risks I must bear if you do?
Because the drafters attempted to accommodate diverse market
conditions within a general standard, however, section 2-609 invites evasion of the initial performance obligation. For example,
while the insecure party presses for adequate assurances, he must
worry about whether a court will find the assurances he seeks consistent with optimal mitigation. The very generality of section 2609 invites evasive renegotiation of the contract as the price for

U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1978) provides in relevant part: "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if
commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed return."
I" Three questions remain in applying the broad standards of § 2-609: What are "reasonable grounds for insecurity"? What are "adequate assurances of performance"? And when
can the buyer safely suspend his own performance? Viewing breach as an extension of credit
to the breacher clarifies these questions. The occurrence of a contingency requiring either
party to adjust establishes reasonable grounds for insecurity. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-609 comment 3 (1978) (reasonable grounds for insecurity include situations where buyer "falls behind" in his account or seller makes "defective" deliveries to other buyers). An obligor can
adequately assure the obligee that he will perform by establishing either that no readjustment contingency has occurred or, if it has occurred, that the terms and price of the credit
meets current commercial standards. See, e.g., id. § 2-609 comment 4 (adequate assurance
includes "posting of a guaranty" or good credit report). A buyer's suspension of performance
is reasonable only if consistent with an efficient mitigation strategy. This situation parallels
an insolvent debtor's choice between liquidation or reorganization. If the going-concern
value of the contract (discounted by the expected costs of a nonsatisfactory breach) exceeds
its liquidation value, efficient mitigation requires a buyer to maintain the contract.
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"adequate assurances." Alternatively, the mitigation model suggests the advisability in a competitive market of a precise laundry
list of conditions creating insecurity. A clear and highly inclusive
insecurity rule would reduce evasion by the obligor while the market would restrain the obligee's opportunistic use of the rule's
overbreadth.
3.

The Duty to Deal with the Breacher

Most courts have declined to impose any duty on a mitigator to
deal with the breacher, even where the breacher offers the best readjustment option. For example, suppose that several weeks after
the August 1 repudiation, Seller offered to deliver a conforming
compressor if Buyer agreed to pay the price in cash with an interest discount instead of the sixty-day credit provided by contract.5
Seller has in effect entered the salvage market and bid for the
cover contract. If Seller were a third party presenting the lowest
bid, optimal mitigation would require Buyer to accept the best
cover option or risk losing the ability to recover the entire damage
bill from Seller. 58 A court would not require Buyer to accept
Seller's offer of cash with a discount, however, even if it were superior to all other alternatives and even if it did not require Buyer to
relinquish any claims arising from the breach. 57 Similarly, courts
s Suppose that Seller instead offered to comply fully with the contract by the September
delivery date. Would Buyer have to deal with him then? Unless Buyer has cancelled the
contract or otherwise changed his position, the Code grants Seller the right to retract the
repudiation and reinstitute the contract even though Buyer would be legitimately insecure
about the possible nonsatisfactory breach. U.C.C. § 2-611 (1978).
5' The doctrine of avoidable consequences acts as a restraint on the damage bill eventually submitted by the mitigator. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
5, Obviously, the mitigator would not have to accept the modified offer if it required him
to abandon his rights under the original contract. See, e.g., Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc., 464
F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1972); Campfield v. Sauer, 189 F. 576 (6th Cir. 1911).
Even if the modified offer preserved prior rights, however, "it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to make another contract with the defendant who has repudiated, even though he
offers terms that would result in avoiding loss." 5 A. Corbin, supra note 45, § 1043 (footnote
omitted). See also, e.g., Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 289 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1923)
(nonbreaching buyer has no duty to mitigate by providing bond rather than by paying on
credit); Coppola v. Marden, Orth & Hastings Co., 282 Ill. 281, 118 N.E. 499 (1917) (no duty
to pay in cash when credit terms are material part of contract); Louis Cook Mfg. Co. v.
Randall, 62 Iowa 244, 17 N.W. 507 (1883) (same); Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., 212
Kan. 301, 510 P.2d 1212 (1973) (where one broker in commodity trading firm had traded in
disregard of principal's orders, principal had no duty to deal with another broker from same
firm even though that might reduce damages); Cain v. Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 196 Kan.
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have permitted buyers to reject offers to purchase the contract
goods at higher prices58 or at different shipping points.59
Again, the presence of a competitive market explains this limitation on Buyer's mitigation responsibility. In such an environment,
parties will choose clear rules to restrain evasion by a disappointed
obligor. Any party's comparative advantage in providing a readjustment superior to the market is slight; in our hypothetical,
Seller can borrow on the'market as easily as Buyer.60 Thus, the noduty-to-deal rule reinforces an obligor's categorical performance
responsibility, discouraging evasion, without substantially increasing the costs of readjustment.
4. Post-Breach Mitigation: Time of Repudiation v. Time of
Performance
Upon anticipatory repudiation, the common law permits an obligee either to seek damages at the time of repudiation or to wait
until time for performance and recover damages based upon the
market differential at that later date.6 1 Assume, in our hypothetical, that following the August 1 repudiation Buyer took no further
action until the September 15 time for performance. During the
six-week period, the market price of a contract compressor increased again from $280,000 to just over $300,000. Despite Buyer's
failure to respond earlier in a steeply rising market, he would be
entitled to the full difference between the $250,000 contract price
and the $300,000 market price at the time of performance.8 2
497, 502, 413 P.2d 98, 102 (1966) ("[A]n innocent party is not [automatically] required to
execute a less advantageous contract with one who has already welshed on his agreement.");
Frohlich v. Independent Glass Co., 144 Mich. 278, 107 N.W. 889 (1906) (buyer's failure to
pay old indebtedness does not absolve seller of later contract breach nor does it force buyer
to pay cash to mitigate); Coxe Bros. v. Anoka Waterworks, Elec. Light & Power Co., 87
Minn. 56, 91 N.W. 265 (1902) (buyer not required to pay cash in lieu of credit even though
seller offered discount which would make requested cash payment equivalent to original
credit offer).
" See, e.g., Campfield v. Sauer, 189 F. 576 (6th Cir. 1911); Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v.
Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
59 See, e.g., Pope Metals Co. v. Sadek, 149 Wis. 394, 135 N.W. 851 (1912).
"Courts have expressed this notion through what we have termed the "equal advantage"
rule. See Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930
(1977). See also supra note 19.
"1 See, e.g., Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952); Missouri
Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881).
" See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(a); 2-713(1) (1978). See generally 5 A. Corbin, supra note 45, §
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This common-law rule appears inconsistent with the joint-cost
minimization principle embodied in the doctrine of avoidable consequences.6 3 Free choice is efficient only so long as the decisionmaker internalizes all relevant costs and benefits. The nonbreacher, however, does not "see" an external cost that should be
relevant in deciding how and when to readjust. Here, if the market
declines, Buyer would retain all of the benefits from waiting while,
if the market rises, Seller must bear all the costs. Without a legal
rule to encourage him, Buyer lacks incentives to make the efficient
decision. Indeed, Buyer's incentive is always to wait until the time
for performance in order to speculate at Seller's expense." Moreover, the Code's reformulation of the common-law anticipatory repudiation rule, allowing an obligee to await performance for a
"commercially reasonable time," 65 also seems inadequate to encourage optimal mitigation because it too allows Buyer to
speculate. 66
The goal of any rulemaking strategy, however, includes minimiz1042 (stating responses to anticipatory repudiation under common law and noting that responding party need not risk money or reputation); C. McCormick, supra note 1, at 665-67
(noting that the remedy for nondelivery is the difference between contract price and market
price at time of performance); Jackson, supra note 5, at 75, 76 & n.24, 77-78 (1978) (citing
cases).
'3See Mays Mills, Inc. v. McRae, 187 N.C. 707, 122 S.E. 762 (1924); Cron & Dehn, Inc. v.
Chelan Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 P. 999 (1930); 2 S. Williston, The Law Governing
Sales of Goods at Common Law and under the Uniform Sales Act §§ 587-88 (2d ed. 1924)
[hereinafter cited as S. Williston, Sales]; Jackson, supra note 5, at 86-94.
" See Jackson, supra note 5, at 93-94.
65 U.C.C. § 2-610(a) (1978). Following an anticipatory repudiation, the aggrieved party
may await performance for a "commercially reasonable" time. Buyer can then choose either
to cover under § 2-712 or to recover the difference between the contract and the market
price under § 2-713. In either case, the key question is whether the market price at the time
of repudiation or the price at the time for performance should be used in computing damages. A statutory analysis of the relevant Code provisions fails to answer this question because the Code's language can support either the time of performance or the time of repudiation as the relevant base period. See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, Commercial Transactions:
Principles and Policies 319-20 (1982). Courts deciding such cases under the Code are divided. Compare Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill.
App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973) (time of
repudiation) with Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford, 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977) (time for performance presumptively reasonable unless evidence suggests earlier opportunity to purchase substitute goods is readily available). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 comment f (1979) (mirroring the Code's concern with advancing the time at which the
mitigation duty accrues).
6 Jackson, supra note 5, at 100-01. But see A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 65, at 32325 (arguing that a time of repudiation rule implicitly--and unrealistically-assumes fully
compensatory damages will be awarded).
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ing the evasion problems produced by an ambiguous obligation
rule as well as reducing readjustment costs. In this case, the tradeoff is clear. The common-law time-of-performance rule encourages
an obligee to extort a side payment from the obligor in exchange
for his agreement to cover promptly in a rising market. On the
other hand, to require mitigation at the time of repudiation would
enhance the potency of any threats of evasive acts.6 7 Thus, the
common-law time-of-performance rule is also an implicit security
against evasion, particularly the threat of nonsatisfactory breach.6 8
The rule is an weak security device, however, because it fails to
reduce substantially the nonbreacher's risk of undercompensation.
If the obligor waits until the time for performance and then announces breach, his ability to threaten inadequate or delayed payment of the damage bill remains unchecked.
The net effect of requiring a more timely cover remains indeterminate. In our example, Buyer could cover on the spot market
shortly after repudiation, but, if the market for substitute performance is ample, Buyer's comparative advantage in covering is only
marginally better than Seller's ability prior to repudiation. Increases in the evasive behavior of the disgruntled Seller would arguably consume these marginal gains. The most that can be said of
the common-law repudiation rule is that it is not plainly inferior to
any .other preformulated rule.
C. Tender, Rejection, and Cure
1.

The Perfect Tender Rule

Under the common-law perfect tender rule, an obligee has no
duty to accept defective performance or offers to remedy the defect following a tender of nonconforming goods.6 9 Assume, for example, that Seller tenders a compressor in due course on the 15th
of September. On examination, Buyer discovers that the aluminum
casing used is Type B rather than Type A as specified in the contract. Seller concedes that Type B casing is a slightly lighter alloy
" Some common-law cases implicitly recognize this argument. See, e.g., Saxe v. Penokee
Lumber Co., 159 N.Y. 371, 54 N.E. 14 (1899). See also 2 S.Williston, Sales, supra note 63.
" See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 65, at 325.
69 See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978); Uniform Sales Act § 69(1) (1906); 1 S.Williston, Sales, supra
note 63, § 225; Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Study in the Impact of Codification
Upon a Commercial Problem, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457 (1949).
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and costs $3,000 less than the contract-specified variety. Furthermore, although the lighter casing will increase the risk of heat dispersion to some extent, an insurance policy can be purchased for
$2,500 to guard against this contingency. Nonetheless, Buyer decides to reject the "nonconforming" tender. Seller then offers
Buyer $3,000 if he retracts his rejection and accepts the compressor with the Type B casing. Must Buyer accept Seller's offer? The
common-law perfect tender rule offers Buyer a choice: accept the
deficient performance and recover the reduction in value as damages or reject the defective tender and recover the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of
0
7

tender.

The discretion offered by the perfect tender rule is not inconsistent with the mitigation principle. Even without legal compulsion,
Buyer would have incentives to elect the cheapest readjustment
option to reduce his exposure as a creditor seeking reimbursement
of the damage bill. Buyer may also earn goodwill and a reputation
as an efficient mitigator that will be reflected in the terms of subsequent transactions. Only a counterbalancing opportunity for opportunistic gains, therefore, would divert Buyer from the appropriate course, and such gains are unlikely to present themselves in a
developed market. For example, the cost of potential adjustments
or a corresponding unwillingness to accept a compensatory payment in place of rejection can be easily tested by the market. If
Buyer's refusal is idiosyncratic or strategic, Seller simply offers the
compressor elsewhere at a competitive price. The existence of
many and close substitute performances reduces not only the bargaining range within which strategic claims can be made, but also
the uncertainty that encourages them. Furthermore, Seller has an
incentive to reveal the cost of his various adjustment options because ultimately he bears these costs anyway.
Suppose, however, that a "double lightning bolt" causes both
Seller and Buyer to experience regret. This could happen, for example, if the market price for a conforming compressor declined,
but a temporary shortage increased the cost of Type A aluminum
casing. Seller would have an incentive, in such a situation, to sub70 Although both the British and American Sales Acts incorporated the perfect tender

rule, common-law courts have developed some flexibility in its application. See, e.g., LeRoy
Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1947); Honnold, supra note 69, at 460-62.
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stitute the less costly Type B casing to protect his expected profits.
Buyer, on the other hand, would now prefer to escape the contract-by rejecting Seller's tender as "nonconforming"-and
purchase a compressor at the lower market price. 71 However uncommon this result might be, the drafters of the Code, and Professor Llewellyn in particular, feared that in such a case the commonlaw perfect tender rule would not yield optimal results. During the
years in which the Code was in draft form, Llewellyn and other
scholars expressed concern about the phenomenon of "surprise rejections" and the imposition of unnecessary costs on the breaching
party.72 Although they framed the argument in terms of "economic
waste" -wastefully forcing a seller to take goods back-they feared
strategic moves by the buyer to exploit a minor defalcation for his
own purposes.
2. The Right of Cure
Section 2-508(2), the result of this concern, permits a seller to
"cure" a defective tender."5 If our Seller reasonably believed that
Buyer would find a compressor with a lighter casing acceptable
with or without a money allowance, then section 2-508(2) grants
Seller an additional period of time to substitute a "conforming"
tender.74 Determining when such a right of cure should be available, however, presents a problem. The conventional surprise rejection illustration suggests that, if a seller were under an obligation
to tender 1,000 widgets and tendered only 999, rejection by the
buyer would trigger the right of cure under section 2-508(2). 75 One
71 See Schwartz, Cure, supra note 5, at 556-59 (arguing that conditions necessary to produce buyer bad faith are unlikely to occur in markets where prices rarely undergo dramatic

fluctuations).
71 See Honnold, supra note 69, at 469-70; Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society.
II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341, 389 (1937).
71 Section 2-508(2) affords a seller time beyond tender to cure the defect "[w]here the
buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe
would be acceptable with or without money allowance."
The categorical right to return defective goods is further qualified by § 2-608 (acceptance
can be revoked only if the nonconformity substantially impairs quality), § 2-504 (defective
contract of carriage is basis for rejection only if material loss or delay results), and § 2-612

(any nonconforming installment can be rejected, but only where nonconformity substantially impairs value of the installment).
71 See supra note 73.
7' Comment 2 of § 2-106 reads in part:

It is in general intended to continue the policy of requiring exact performance by the
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cannot reconcile this analysis, however, with the Code's definition
of "conforming" goods. If the parties reasonably believed such a
tender would be acceptable because of prior dealings or prevailing
usage of trade, then the contract would incorporate this contextual
understanding within the section 2-106 definition of "conforming
goods. 17 The surprise rejection illustration typically used as an example of section 2-508(2) thus merely illustrates a seller's legitimate surprise at the rejection of conforming goods. Such a rejection would be wrongful ab initio and never require the application
7
of section 2-508.

Circumstances in which goods require adjustment before they
are in good working order78 also provide inappropriate illustrations
of section 2-508(2). If adjustment is regarded as incidental to the
tender of such goods, then the need to adjust does not render the
goods nonconforming. A buyer's attempted rejection would again
be wrongful.
To invoke section 2-508(2) properly, one must imagine a case in
which the tender is clearly defective, but the seller nonetheless anticipates that the buyer will accept the tender as a legitimate readjustment option. These requirements are satisfied where one can
evaluate the deficiency on the market and correct it with a moneseller of his obligations as a condition to his right to require acceptance. However, the
seller is in part safeguarded against surprise as a result of sudden technicality on the
buyer's part by the provisions of section 2-508 ....
U.C.C. § 2-106 comment 2 (1978). See also J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law
Under the Uniform Commercial Code 321 (2d ed. 1980) ("Thus, presumably, in absence of
special circumstances, when the seller delivers goods which are not identical to those called
for in the contract but which are the functional equivalent, he has reasonable cause to believe they will be acceptable."); Honnold, supra note 69, at 474 (discussing the then new
option of cure proposed by Revised Sales Act).
7s See U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1978) (defining goods as conforming if "they are in accordance
with the obligations under the contract"); id. § 1-201(11) (defiming "contract" as the "total
legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement"); id. § 1-201(3) (defiming "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act").
7 See A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 65, at 265-66. The drafters of the Code are
largely responsible for the misleading conventional interpretation of § 2-508(2). For example, comment 2 provides that the "reasonable grounds [to believe a tender would be acceptable] can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade." U.C.C. § 2508 comment 2 (1978). In such a case, of course, the goods would be conforming and any
rejection would be wrongful and thus not embraced within § 2-508.
78 See, e.g., Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967); Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d
3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (City Ct. 1967).
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tary payment accompanying the tender. What surprises Seller in
our hypothetical is not the rejection of his defective performance,
but the rejection of the defective performance accompanied by the
offer to send $3,000-more than enough money to insure against
the consequences of the defect.
Granting a seller the right to cure under appropriate conditions
serves two functions. First, section 2-508(2) encourages a buyer anticipating special losses from nonperformance to bargain for additional protection at the time of contracting. If a buyer attaches an
idiosyncratic valuation to the seller's performance, the inadequacy
of ordinary methods of cure necessitates such augmented protection. Even without section 2-508(2), however, the objective damages principle would encourage the early communication of idiosyncratic values. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the cure
provision restrains opportunistic claims by Buyer. Unfortunately,
it also invites evasion by Seller through the tender of inadequate
substitutes as a "cure."
Even in a competitive market situation, however, a right of cure
may be necessary to restrain an obligee's opportunistic behavior.
Despite the initial existence of a market at the time of contracting,
the double lightning bolt transforms the contract into a specialized
relationship with few and imperfect substitutes. This species of bilateral monopoly raises legitimate fears of costly renegotiation following the defective tender.79 The doctrine of avoidable consequences, moreover, fails to restrain opportunism under these
conditions. Although an obligee will be unable to recover avoidable
costs and any expenses saved if he strategically rejects the obligor's
tender, the exclusively defensive character of the rule fails to protect accrued contract rights that optimal mitigation could have
preserved.8 0 Seller has valuable return rights in the favorable price
shift, but possesses no effective remedy other than renegotiation if
Buyer elects to reject the inadequately housed compressor and
merely walks away from a now disfavored deal.
In short, once circumstances eliminate close substitutes, categorical standards of performance may no longer reliably serve to reduce costs. The common-law perfect tender rule encourages the
nonbreacher in a bilateral monopoly to demand a premium to ac-

79

See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1101-02.

80 See supra note 1 and text accompanying notes 24-27.
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cept the retendered goods. Reducing readjustment costs under
these circumstances requires a rule that reduces buyer opportunism by more than it increases seller evasion. The failure of the
Code's cure provision thus lies in its ambiguity and generality.
Only where the context clearly signals a need for more complex
rules should the seller be empowered to demand the right of cure.81
D. ParticularizedAgreements: Liquidated Damages, Bonuses,
and Express Conditions
When preformulated contract rules fail to fit circumstances, contracting parties would prefer more carefully tailored alternatives.
Common-law courts have traditionally looked with skepticism,
however, at the private arrangements designed by atypical contracting parties. Liquidated damages clauses, for example, are traditionally held unenforceable as penalties if they fail to mirror the
objective compensation achievable under standard damage rules. 2
Also, bonus agreements may be attacked as unlawful wagers if they
attempt to protect risks and values that are not objectively quantifiable.8 s Finally, express conditions which permit suspension of an
agreed performance if a particular condition is unsatisfied are carefully scrutinized
with the injunction that the law abhors a
84
forfeiture.

Specially designed contract provisions are useful in protecting
accrued contract rights from exploitation.8 5 Even in markets with
close substitutes, particularized clauses are important for any atypical bargainer. The objective compensation principle fails to protect any nonmarket or nonpecuniary values that a bargainer may
attach to performance. To the extent judicial scrutiny of liquidated
damages and bonus arrangements prevents the protection of such
81In writing about the need to ameliorate the harsh effects of the common-law rules in
the "double lightening bolt" case, Llewellyn implicitly recognized the equal importance of a
narrowly crafted solution. See Llewellyn, supra note 72, at 378, 389-90, 391 & n.130. See also
Priest, supra note 5, at 968-75 (discussing Llewellyn's influence on the Code rules governing
nonconformity tender).
See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 574-76.
" A wagering contract that creates risk is distinguished from a valid insurance contract
which merely allocates existing risk to another party for a price. See R. Keeton, Basic Text
on Insurance Law 89-90 (1971). If the specialized value is not legally recognizable, then the
bonus arrangement is virtually indistinguishable from a wager on the contract performance.
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 227-29 (1979).
95 See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
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values except through expensive third-party insurance, atypical
bargainers face increased costs of contracting."8 Moreover, the
right to challenge a particular damage or bonus provision exerts an
in terrorem effect discouraging the use of specially negotiated incentive schemes.
The hypothesis that common-law rules of contractual obligation
are implicitly premised on the competitive market model explains
judicial hostility to such arrangements. The existence of a market
checks opportunistic claims: specialized arrangements necessary to
reduce strategic renegotiation are rarely required. In the market
context, fairly negotiated penalty clauses would be rare because
the market would circumscribe their usefulness. Indeed, only the
idiosyncratic bargainer requires a special incentive system to protect his nonpecuniary values-an unusual case for which thirdparty insurance is an available, although more expensive, substitute.17 Thus, penalty provisions found in market-regulated transactions frequently may signal unfairness in the bargaining process.
Given the difficulty of verifying idiosyncratic values, a rule of
thumb that incentive clauses protecting atypical values are indicative of fraud or duress 8 may well be justifiable.
But this defense of a strict scrutiny of specially tailored incentive arrangements ignores their crucial importance in coping with
the peculiar problems of specialized contractors. When contracting
takes place in a more complex, relational context, the full cost of
such scrutiny becomes apparent.

III.
A.

THE PROBLEM OF SPECALIZATION

Specialized and Relational Contracts

The extent of contractual specialization is the variable that most
influences the mitigation strategies of contracting parties. An
available market for substitute performances provides a powerful
See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 578-83.
See Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982) (arguing that insuring idiosyncratic losses is frequently irrational and parties would rarely bargain to protect nonpecuniary values through liquidated damages). See also Clarkson, Miller
& Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 351. But
see Polinsky, Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. Legal Stud. 427
(1983) (for risk averse parties, a liquidated damages clause is optimal method of allocating
and sharing risks).
" See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, supra note 5, at 588-93.
88
37
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explanation for the apparent incongruity between categorical rules
of contractual obligation and the mitigation principle. By contrast,
specialization implies that when midcourse readjustments are required, the market will not be available to deter strategic claims.
Once the need for readjustment arises, a specialized context encourages parties to waste resources in strategic maneuvering.
Moreover, the problems caused by specialization can erupt even
where the parties initially have perfectly substitutable trading
partners. Whenever the original obligation imperfectly provides for
future contingencies, a mutual dependency similar to that of a relational contract develops between the parties."' Contracts are relational to the extent that parties are unable to reduce performance obligations to definitive terms, either because of uncertain
future conditions or the inherent difficulty of adequately characterizing certain complex situations.9 0 An analogous problem exists
in defining readjustment duties. Even where the parties can precisely define performance-i.e., the contract itself is not relational-readjustment contingencies may or may not be susceptible
to advance planning. In relational contracts, it seems almost certain that the very difficulties which infect performance specification will present equally formidable obstacles in defining readjustment agreements. Hence, relational contracts present a "worst
case" environment for contractual formulation.
Softening the categorical quality of the common-law rules offers
one response to the problem of specialization. Through the doctrine of substantial performance and related provisions, commonlaw courts have crafted rules for certain classes of contracts incorporating both performance and readjustment responsibilities.9 1
These more responsive rules reduce a potential mitigator's incentive to demand a premium for his cooperation, but their additional
complexity also increases the threat of evasion by a disgruntled obligor. An obligor may thus succeed in claiming that either an inadequate performance or an undercompensatory quasi-performance

89 See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1100-03. Because specialization increases the difference between one readjustment strategy and the next best alternative, the bargaining range confronted during renegotiation correspondingly expands. Absent
a competitive market, objective valuations of the performance will be difficult to ascertain.
See supra note 9.
91 See infra text accoihpanying notes 114-17.
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(breach with damages) 92 satisfies his contractual obligation. Reducing the incidence of one type of behavior almost necessarily exacerbates the other.
The rules governing specific performance are typical of the more
complex obligations routinely applied to specialized contractors.
Specific performance serves as the preformulated remedy for specialized contracts involving sales of unique goods or land.93 But an
unconditional right to specific performance would increase opportunism and its associated renegotiation costs. Courts have therefore conditioned specific performance awards on a number of factors, including the obligee's "good faith"'" and adequate security
for the return performance.9 5 For example, although the courts
usually grant the cost of completing performance for a builder's
breach of a construction contract, they will deny such recovery
where the award greatly exceeds the "economic loss" caused by the
breach.96 Such a carefully conditioned right of specific performance
not only restrains evasion but also selectively filters the potentially
" See supra note 32 and accompanying text concerning "quasi-performance" and nonsatisfactory breach.
,3See, e.g., Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(inability to cover on market justifies specific performance award); Henderson v. Fisher, 236
Cal. App. 2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965) (contract for land presumptively unique), aff'd,
260 Cal. App. 2d 218, 66 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1968); U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1978) ("where the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances"). A form of specific performance-the cost of
completion-is generally awarded for breach of construction contracts. See, e.g., Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); Di Bernardo v. Gunneson, 65
A.D.2d 828, 409 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978) (mem.); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 362
(1979). Courts also award specific performance for breach of certain relational contracts
where specialization increases the risks of evasion of performance. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co.
v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F.
Supp. 429, 442-43 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
"See, e.g., Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. Ct. App.
1966); Schwartz, Specific Performance, supra note 5, at 272-74.
"6 See, e.g., Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1971); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 377 (1979).
" An owner generally recovers the cost of completion unless this cost greatly exceeds the
diminution in the market value of the property owing to the defect. See, e.g., Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (contractor need not replace all
pipes in house when difference between pipe specified and that installed was small but cost
of replacement would be high); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109
(Okla. 1962) (refusing to award $29,000 cost of completion where market value diminished
by $300), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963); W.G. Slugg Seed & Fertilizer, Inc. v. Paulsen
Lumber, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 220, 214 N.W.2d 413 (1974) (refusing to award $15,000 cost of
completion where diminution in value was only $5,000).
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opportunistic cases where the obligor's cost of performance is sub97
stantially greater than the market value of performance.
A casual review of various contractual rules thus reveals a noticeable sensitivity to the character of the market. At the same
time, it also suggests that creating efficient, preformulated rules
incorporating both performance and mitigation responsibilities is
no simple matter.
B.

Post-Breach Mitigation: The Duty to Deal with the
Breacher

To what extent have courts successfully adapted market-environment mitigation rules to the context of more specialized transactions? The analysis in the next section concludes that, at least
for certain classes of transactions, the common law has created appropriate rules of thumb that accommodate the specialized
environment.
In a specialized context, the value of performance to an obligee may well exceed any
objective market calculation. Courts recognizing such a specialized value will thus award the
cost of completion despite the difference between obligee's valuation and the market's. For
example, one court stated:
If a proud householder, who plans to live out his days in the home of his dreams,
orders a new roof of red barrel tile and the roofer instead installs a purple one, money
damages for the reduced value of his house may not be enough to offset the strident
offense to aesthetic sensibilities ....
Gory Associated Indus., Inc. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 358 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory
Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1443, 1471-73 & nn.94-100 (1980) (citing
cases); Harris, Ogus & Phillips, Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus, 95 Law Q.
Rev. 581, 589-91 & nn.53-63 (1979) (citing English cases).
Where courts conclude that a plaintiff's insistence on the cost of completion represents an
opportunistic bargaining position rather than a specialized value, however, they award only
the diminution in value. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109
(Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963); Wigsell v. Corporation of the School for the
Indigent Blind, 8 Q.B.D. 357 (1882). But see Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286
N.W. 235 (1939) (cost of completion awarded where court inferred bad faith evasion by
obligor).
Although this more elaborate and complex damage rule demonstrates a sensitivity to the
specialized environment, no preformulated rule of general application will successfully restrain both evasion and opportunism. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25 and 131-34
(arguing for judicial tolerance of individually tailored arrangements in specialized contexts,
the development of situation-specific norms of limited application, or both); Speidel, CourtImposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 369,
411-22 (1981) (arguing for court-imposed adjustments under discretionary, non-rule-based
intervention, but recognizing uncertainty costs such interventions might impose on subsequent bargainers).
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1. Avoidable Consequences
Assume now that Seller assembles the industrial air conditioning
compressors to Buyer's unique specifications so that at the time
for performance there is no spot market for conforming compressors. Seller proposes to perform the contract for an additional payment of $40,000 which, although wrongful, represents the best
available opportunity. If Buyer fails to accept the offer, will the
doctrine of avoidable consequences preclude his recovery of losses?
Unlike other mitigation problems, the duty-to-deal issue has
been the subject of substantial litigation. In cases where the breach
occurs in a market with close substitute performances, courts
rarely penalize the injured party for failing to accept a substitute
offer from the breacher 9e As the market for substitute performance thins, however, the judicial decisions become increasingly less
uniform. Not surprisingly, these decisions at first appear confused
and contradictory. For example, courts have generally held that an
obligee should accept a new offer on similar terms and should deal
on modified or additional terms where no close substitute transaction is available.99 On the other hand, they have not imposed a
duty to deal if the new offer is "personally repugnant" or oner-

See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
The extent of contractual specialization in employment contracts seems to explain why
courts have been more willing to require the "injured" employee to accept a new offer from
the contract breacher. See, e.g., Dary v. The Caroline Miller, 36 F. 507 (S.D. Ala. 1888)
(seaman forfeited damages by refusing master's offer to reemploy for return voyage thereby
saving losses); Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N.W. 362 (1930) (hotel
manager's refusal to accept new offer by breacher admissible in mitigation); Heiferman v.
Greenhut Cloak Co., 143 N.Y.S. 411 (City Ct.) (designer's refusal to accept offer of reemployment barred recovery), rev'd, 83 Misc. 435, 145 N.Y.S. 142 (App. Term 1913), original
order reinstated mem., 163 A.D. 939, 148 N.Y.S. 1119 (1914).
Similarly, courts have consistently imposed a duty to deal with the breacher in disputes
over specialized service contracts. See, e.g., Henrici v. South Feather Land & Water Co., 177
Cal. 442, 170 P. 1135 (1918) (landowner required to pay additional charge for water services
rather than permit crops to be lost); Severini v. Sutter-Butte Canal Co., 59 Cal. App. 154,
210 P. 49 (1922) (defendant's refusal to pay irrigation fee in advance barred recovery for
subsequent loss of crop); Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178, 236 P. 598 (1924) (jury
should have been allowed to consider whether unreasonable to shut down drilling operation
rather than accept offer to supply gas at $5 more per day); Eggert v. Kullmann, 204 Wis. 60,
234 N.W. 349 (1931) (plaintiff's refusal to pay defendant contractor additional $160 to underpin house during construction bars recovery for subsequent collapse of structure).

1006

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 69:967

ous, 100 involves inferior work, 101 is distasteful, 02 is made in bad
10 4
faith,1 03 or requires a waiver of damages for breach.
Because specialized contexts warrant more responsive mitigation
duties, the law arguably ought to require a mitigator to deal with
the breacher, even upon additional or inferior terms, whenever
substitute transactions are clearly inferior to the breacher's offer.
Indeed, the seemingly contradictory common-law decisions have
consistently identified the absence of alternative performance as a
major variable justifying an expanded duty to deal with the
breacher.
The cases that apparently depart from such a duty-to-deal principle in the specialized context do so when either of two types of
evasion costs plays a key role. Evidence of bad faith extortion is
the first variable that influences duty-to-deal outcomes. 105 Specialized environments significantly increase the risk of threats, bluffs,
110See, e.g., Price v. Davis, 187 Mo. App. 1, 173 S.W. 64 (1915) (employee not required to
return to job because parties had quarreled prior to wrongful discharge); Connell v. Averill,
8 A.D. 524, 40 N.Y.S. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (head porter not required to work at more physically demanding job of house porter); Levin v. Standard Fashion Co., 11 N.Y.S. 706 (Ct.
C.P. 1890) (wrongfully discharged employee called a thief and otherwise insulted by defendant's agent); Williams v. School Dist., 104 Wash. 659, 177 P. 635 (1919) (school principal
not required to work as teacher under former subordinate).
102 See, e.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89
Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970) (plaintiff entitled to refuse "different and inferior" leading role in
another motion picture in substitution of breached contract); Clayton-Greene v. De
Courville, 36 T.L.R. 790 (K.B. Div'l Ct. 1920) (same).
102 See, e.g., Horn v. Luntz, 125 N.Y.S. 786 (App. Term 1910) (no obligation to accept
reemployment following assault by employer); Plesofsky v. Kaufman & Flonacker, 140
Tenn. 208, 204 S.W. 204 (1918) (buyer not required to pay cash in lieu of agreed credit if
"distasteful burden"); Stanley Manly Boys' Clothes, Inc. v. Hickey, 113 Tex. 482, 259 S.W.
160 (Tex. App. Comm'n) (buyer need not accept "humiliating" offer to deal on cash basis),
aff'd, 259 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. 1924).
103 See, e.g., Schisler v. Perfection Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N.W. 17 (1934) (dictum); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd,
123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934) (avoidable consequences doctrine does not apply where
defendant electric company made bad faith attempt to coerce payment of disputed bill in
unrelated transaction by terminating service).
10' See, e.g., Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1972) (seller of equipment not required to accept modified contract in mitigation when it includes abandonment
of any right of action for prior breach as a condition of acceptance); Everett v. Emmons
Coal Mining Co., 289 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1923) (same); Campfield v. Sauer, 189 F. 576 (6th Cir.
1911) (same); Cain v. Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 196 Kan. 497, 413 P.2d 98 (1966) (same).
'05 Bad faith extortion is defined in this context as one party's attempt to coercively redefine contractual obligations to secure a larger slice of the "pie" than the contract originally
allocated.
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or other games of "chicken" designed merely to redistribute the
existing contractual entitlements. Contracting parties considering
this problem in advance would prefer rules that discourage bad
faith claims, 106 perhaps by withdrawing the mitigation duty whenever the risk of such evasion is substantial. Reflecting this concern
about extortion, courts have uniformly refused to impose a duty to
deal when an offer requires the waiver of rights under the original
10 Contract rules policing contractual modification are another response to the height-

ened risk of extortion in specialized environments. For example, the common-law preexisting duty rule can be usefully contrasted with the more permissive regulation of contractual
modification under the Uniform Commercial Code. The preexisting duty rule denies enforcement of a renegotiation or contractual modification where an obligor agrees merely to
do that which he is already contractually obligated to do. The rule is primarily designed to
reduce the incidence of extortionate modification in construction, employment, and other
specialized contractual relationships. See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99
(9th Cir. 1902) (refusing enforcement of a modified contract to pay fishermen increased
compensation demanded once they reached work site in Alaska).
The preexisting duty rule, however, often fails accurately to mirror the underlying bad
faith behavior. First, the rule discourages cost-reducing renegotiations in addition to threats.
Moreover, the obligor satisfies the rule by assuming any additional obligations whether or
not the "additional" duties are themselves part of the strategic maneuver. The Code abandoned this ill-fitting rule of thumb and instead applies a general good faith standard. See
U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978). Because this standard is substantially more difficult to enforce,
however, the Code may not deter extortionate renegotiation as effectively as did the common law. Nonetheless, if parties generally execute contracts for the sale of goods in the
context of a well-developed market for substitutes, the costs saved through legitimate renegotiations will exceed the increased enforcement costs of policing bad faith modification.
Courts also express concern with bad faith extortion through the rules restraining economic duress. Such cases arise when the obligor has performed the modified contract, but
the "injured party" seeks restitution of the value of his performance because economic duress forced his agreement to the modified terms. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral
Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971). The market for substitutes is
the key variable in economic duress cases. For example, "a mere threat by one party to
breach the contract by not delivering the required items, though wrongful, does not in itself
constitute economic duress. It must also appear that the threatenedparty could not obtain
the goods from anothersource of supply." Id. at 130-31, 272 N.E.2d at 534, 324 N.Y.S.2d at
25-26 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Because a market for substitutes will effectively
control a defendant's behavior with no need for legal rules, a prima facie claim of economic
duress thus requires a plaintiff to show a specialized environment.
It is difficult to police such bad faith behavior, however, because the distinction between
legitimate requests for renegotiation and bad faith threats lies entirely in the honesty of a
party's assertion that a readjustment contingency made performance less attractive than
quasi-performance (breach with damages). When a professional athlete requests renegotiation because he now prefers lying in the sun (and paying appropriate compensation) to
playing football or basketball, the issue turns on whether that claim is true or represents a
bluff designed to obtain additional compensation. Because such a claim is almost impervious to accurate proof, the law must choose between no legal regulation and crudely devised
rules of thumb.
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contract, is "humiliating and
degrading," or otherwise appears to
10 7
be strategically motivated.

Courts have also declined to impose a duty to deal-even though
the alternative performances impose greater costs-whenever there
is a substantial risk that the breacher will undercompensate the
injured party.108 For example, courts have not imposed a duty to
deal in construction contracts where the new offer requires a postponed performance on modified terms.109 These cases seem puzzling unless one recalls that a tender of inadequate compensation
(a nonsatisfactory breach) is a principal means of evading assigned
performance obligations. 10 Where readjustment requires an extensive "loan" without sufficient guarantee of payment, the mitigator
must accept a credit contract which he would never negotiate separately on the market.
This rationale for refusing to impose a duty to deal also applies
to cases involving personal service or aesthetic contracts where a
reemployment offer is "different" or "inferior." ' , Even where insolvency is not a principal issue, significant undercompensation
can result if there are difficult-to-measure losses in human capital
generated by the breach announcement itself. In the cases of Shirley MacLaine' 1 2 and other entertainers, 1 I3 for example, the value of
107

See supra notes 100-04. The difficulty of proving bad faith behavior justifies the use of

screening devices as proxies for undesirable conduct. Thus, the demand that plaintiff abandon rights under the original contract or a demand for renegotiation accompanied by unpleasant behavior provides plausible surrogates for the underlying bad faith behavior. See,
e.g., Howard v. Vaughan-Monnig Shoe Co., 82 Mo. App. 405 (1900); Levin v. Standard Fashion Co., 11 N.Y.S. 706 (Ct. C.P. 1890); Williams v. School Dist., 104 Wash. 659, 177 P. 635
(1919); Lemoine v. Alkan, 33 Philippine 162 (1916).
108See, e.g., Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588 (4th Cir.
1972) (absent written information and assurances, decision not to accept substitute performance not unreasonable); City of Paragould v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 171 Ark. 86, 284
S.W. 529 (1926) (no duty to accept new rate if there is nothing to guarantee performance of
the contract).
109 See, e.g., Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588 (4th Cir.
1972) (owner's refusal to accept substitute performance not unreasonable failure to mitigate); Huskey Mfg. Co. v. Friel-McLeister Co., 84 Pa. Super. 328 (1925) (same).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
I See, e.g., Russellville Special School Dist. No. 14 v. Tinsley, 156 Ark. 283, 245 S.W. 831
(1922) (new offer was "different and inferior"); Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970) (same); Milage v. Woodward,
186 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E. 873 (1906) (same); De Loraz v. McDowell, 22 N.Y.S. 606 (Sup. Ct.
1893) (same), aff'd mem., 142 N.Y. 664, 37 N.E. 570 (1894); Clayton-Greene v. De Courville,
36 T.L.R. 790 (K.B. Div'l Ct. 1920) (same).
112 Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal.
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their services is in part measured by the willingness of others to
pay for them. Because the market cannot readily assess the kind of
contingency that has materialized, it will discount the value of the
services after a breach even where the breach was unrelated to the
value of the entertainer's return performance. The no-duty-to-deal
rule as applied to personal service contracts, then, is best seen as
an implicit penalty clause to discourage breach. Because breach in
such cases generates difficult-to-prove losses which often cannot be
recouped through objective damages, parties negotiating an optimal mitigation scheme would bargain for the additional protection.
2. Substantial Performance
The substantial performance rule parallels the qualified duty to
deal with the breacher in specialized contexts. Suppose that our
Seller installs a compressor on the agreed price terms, but the
compressor's aluminum casing is Type B, a lighter alloy than the
Type A contractually specified. Unlike the perfect tender obligation imposed on the sale of goods, courts have implied only a "substantial performance" obligation on a defective performance in service or construction contracts. 114 The rule of substantial
performance-or material breach-assures the breacher of his accrued contractual gains whenever the tender is consistent with the
overall scheme of the contract, although deficient in some particulars. 11 5 The doctrine expands the duty to mitigate in specialized
Rptr. 737 (1970) (substitute offer was for dramatic role instead of musical comedy and
plaintiff's artistic control over director and screenplay was restricted).
1" See, e.g., De Loraz v. McDowell, 22 N.Y.S. 606 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (defendant's offer to
give actress role in another play, but not guaranteeing the agreed time duration, did not bar
plaintiff's cause of action), aff'd mem., 142 N.Y. 664, 37 N.E. 570 (1894); Clayton-Greene v.
De Courville, 36 T.L.R. 790 (K.B. Div'l Ct. 1920) (actor engaged to play role in play not
required to accept another part because his reputation might possibly have been
compromised).
M See, e.g., Della Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Developers, Inc., 38 Md.
App. 119, 380 A.2d 627 (1977); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889
(1921); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 comment d (1979).
215 If an obligee receives substantially what he bargained for, the breaching obligor does
not automatically forfeit his accrued contractual gains, but instead may reap the benefit of
his bargain less any losses caused by the breach. See, e.g., Dixon v. Nelson, 79 S.D. 44, 50,
107 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1961) (deviations of house construction slight in relation to entire structure and "do not go to the root") Compare O.W. Grun Roofing & Constr. Co. v. Cope, 529
S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (watertight but not uniformly colored roof inconsistent
with the general plan) with Tolstoy Constr. Co. v. Minter, 78 Cal. App. 3d 665, 143 Cal.
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environments by requiring the mitigator to accept a deficient performance, together with objectively measured damages.
The substantial performance doctrine reduces opportunistic
claims by softening the breacher-nonbreacher distinction, thereby
removing opportunities to exploit inadvertent breaches. Such a
rule is sensible in cases such as construction contracts where the
circumstances suggest that renegotiation costs otherwise will be
substantial. Once construction is substantially underway, the alternatives for both parties become inferior to the existing relationship, thus expanding the bargaining range within which the parties
must reach agreement on post-breach adjustments. The obligor
will regard removing the half-constructed object from the site and
offering it to a third party as vastly inferior to acceptance plus
damages because of the costs of removal. Without the substantial
performance rule, the owner-obligee would have an incentive to exploit this situation. On the other hand, a minor deviation will not
significantly increase the risk that a disappointed obligor can
evade his responsibility to the obligee. So long as the performance
is consistent with the general purpose or plan of the contract, objective damages will provide an adequate surrogate to most parties
for any deficiencies. 116 Furthermore, completion of the bulk of the
performance reduces the risk of nonsatisfactory breach.1 1

Rptr. 570 (1978) (a number of relatively small defects in house construction held material
breach). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 comment b (1979) (There is a
need to determine the "extent to which the injured party will be deprived of [his expected]
benefit" and "defects affecting structural soundness" are considered material in construction contracts.).
Alternatively, if the breach is material, the doctrine denies the breacher his accrued con-

tract rights, but allows him a claim in restitution. See Pinches v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church, 55 Conn. 183, 10 A. 264 (1887); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374
(1979).
"I See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(b) (1979) (listing "the extent to which
the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he
will be deprived" as one of the relevant factors in determining whether a breach was
material).

The substantial performance rule is not cost free, however. Any reduction in the clarity of
the performance standard increases opportunities for evasion and threats of nonsatisfactory
breach, particularly where the injured party attaches any idiosyncratic value to performance. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). The rule

thus encourages the atypical bargainer to design a custom arrangement making full performance an express condition of the return performance. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 229 comment b, illustration 1 (1979).

'7 Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 comment e (1979) ("To the extent
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The substantial performance rule, as well as cases imposing a
duty to deal in the specialized context, confirms the predictions of
our mitigation model. As the market for substitute performance
thins, contracting parties prefer expanded mitigation rules and
more narrowly confined obligation rules in order to regulate opportunistic behavior. Such a strategy necessarily increases the opportunities for a disgruntled obligor to evade responsibility. Nevertheless, the trade-off reduces net costs if a rule of thumb
circumscribes the expanded mitigation duties by isolating the risks
of extortion and nonsatisfactory breach.
C. Pre-Breach Mitigation: The Relational Contract
In our discussion thus far, the central problem has been determining the proper trade-off between the benefits of specifying mitigation duties and the consequent dangers. The problem in the relational context, however, is how best to require future action that
cannot be particularized at the time of contracting. The dimensions of mitigation in such a context are so complex that no predetermined mechanism can be fully successful. When parties enter
into a relational contract, frequently one person's performance depends upon the cooperation and performance of another. An optimal relational contract, therefore, would encourage both parties to
undertake cooperative midcourse readjustments. The following
sections explore and recommend the legal instruments that might
achieve this objective.
1.

Readjustment Upon Request

Conventional common-law rules do not encourage midcourse adjustments. Although pre-breach events increasing the risk of nonperformance give grounds for insecurity, they do not impose any
corresponding duty to mitigate.""' Triggering a duty to mitigate
only by a clear and unequivocal breach makes sense in the market
environment. Any adaptation will involve the acquisition of cover
on the market, and, until the time of breach, the obligor is usually
that [the promisee's] expectation is already reasonably secure, in spite of the failure, there is
less reason to conclude that the failure is material.") with U.C.C. § 2-612 (1978) (showing
that a breach of one installment will not automatically breach the whole installment
contract).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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better situated to assess the benefits of such cover than is the
obligee.
Specialization raises additional adjustment possibilities, however. In addition to external cover by actions on the market, the
parties have differing capacities to undertake internal adjustments. Internal readjustment, unlike traditional "cover" from
outside parties, is effected by an obligee's rearrangement of his
own affairs. Thus, it might involve altering production schedules to
accommodate the increased risk of breach, or adjusting requirements to accept imperfect or otherwise altered performance. For
example, our Buyer may be able to reduce the labor strike's expected costs by arranging to install adjustable windows or by delaying occupancy until the strike is settled.
The conventional common-law scheme discourages renegotiation
for such pre-breach adjustment because an obligor's request to renegotiate also creates insecurity-potentially triggering an unintended and undesired determination of breacher status. 119 For instance, Seller may prefer to gamble on settlement of the strike to
avoid being assigned breacher status, thereby forfeiting his gains
from the contract. The mitigation principle, in contrast, would require a rule authorizing a pre-breach readjustment request that
does not also invoke the insecurity mechanism. The obligor would
be required under such a rule to pay for any requested adjustment
regardless of whether he ultimately breaches or performs. Because
adjustment would be undertaken on credit, the rule would entitle a
mitigator to demand security to protect against the risk of nonsatisfactory breach. Although particular contracting parties might
incorporate such a procedure into their agreement, a preformulated rule can induce similar cooperative readjustments.
2. Hadley v. Baxendale Extended
Legal solutions to pre-breach adjustment problems must respond to the related issue of information exchange prior to breach.
Assume, for example, that while making the calibrations necessary
to design the compressor, Seller observed but did not react to the
119 Once a contract is concluded, both parties will be reluctant to engage in pre-breach
adjustment. The mitigation request operates as a forced loan the nonbreacher may be reluctant to extend. Similarly, the breacher may lack the incentive to adjust, preferring instead
to place the onus on the nonbreacher.
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fact that Buyer was constructing a laboratory in which sensitive
research experiments were to be thermostatically controlled. Assume further that, once the system was operational, malfunctions
in the laboratory's automated control processes caused $100,000
worth of experiments to be ruined. Upon examination, Seller discovered that the compressor's thermostat was not calibrated with
sufficient precision to control experiments of such sensitivity and
thus the control processes malfunctioned. Accurate calibration is
sometimes difficult, but imprecise settings of that magnitude are
usually harmless. Buyer, unaware that thermostatic calibrations
were so crucial, had not indicated the sensitive nature of his research projects at the time of contract. Seller therefore argues that
he will be responsible for any ordinary damages, but not for the
$100,000 worth of ruined experiments which he claims were unforeseeable consequential damages.
Seller's argument under conventional contract rules seems powerful. Hadley v. Baxendale120 limits an obligor's responsibility for
the consequences of breach to those needs and circumstances he
had reason to know at the time of contracting. This would include
all ordinary consequences, but an obligor must be made aware of
special or unforeseeable circumstances at the time the bargain is
struck.1 2 1 Unfortunately, in a specialized context, an obligor's extralegal incentives may not motivate him to disclose subsequently
acquired information. 2 2 Of course, disclosure is often made without legal compulsion. But our Seller may be reluctant to disclose
information that could discourage Buyer from going through with
the contract, given that Seller's contractual performance is not
readily marketable elsewhere. Absent some directive rule, the parties may not achieve optimal mitigation.
Formulating the appropriate disclosure rule presents problems,
however. Any attempt to particularize the obligation in advance

110

9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).

See id.
"s

See Klein & Leffler, supra note 29. Clearly, concern with reputation, goodwill, and the

avoidance of contractual disputes encourages disclosure of information casually acquired
during the course of performance even without a legal rule. Concern with repeat business,
however, may not be a consideration in the specialized context. Rights accrued under a oneshot contract with little likelihood of replication may be more valuable than guarding
against a risk that may not materialize, particularly when, as here, disclosure would sacrifice
the gains from an already concluded exchange.
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fails because of its inapplicability to most contractors. A more
promising approach is to extend Hadley v. Baxendale to all those
particular needs of which an obligee is unaware, if the obligor has
reason to know of them at any time before performance is tendered. Thus, Seller's failure to warn Buyer would be a breach of an
implied duty to "rescue" a contracting partner. 123 Under such a
"last clear chance" formulation, Seller would be responsible for the
ruined experiments because he had reason to know of the consequences of improper calibration-and of Buyer's ignorance-prior
to installation. 124 Extending the reach of Hadley v. Baxendale
123 Courts might impose an obligation to disclose post-contract information under conventional tort doctrine as a special relationship justifying a duty to rescue. The contractual
relationship limits the scope of responsibility problems that would plague any broadly based
tort rule. See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 111-13 (1908); Epstein, A Theory
of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 198-200 (1973).
The cases in which courts impose a duty to rescue involve special relationships functionally equivalent to the relational contract. For example, courts have imposed a duty on a
psychiatrist to inform a prospective victim of his patient's intent to assault her, Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), and on a
carrier to warn a foreign passenger of the racial problems in the South, Bullock v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 266 P.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959). Similarly, a special relationship has been
found between a baseball club and its patrons, Lee v. National League Baseball Club, 4 Wis.
2d 168, 89 N.W.2d 811 (1958), and between a tavern owner and his paying customers,
Stachniewicz v. Mar-Can Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971).
Imposing a duty to rescue in some cases, but not all, is analogous to the legal enforceability of serious promises. The variable that best explains the enforceability of a promise is the
context in which the promise is made. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 5, at
1273-88. Promises made in a reciprocal context-one which is conducive to cooperative adjustments between the parties-are generally enforceable. Although legal enforcement increases the reliability of promises already made, it decreases the supply of beneficial future
promises. In nonreciprocal contexts, in which extralegal sanctions are high and cooperative
adjustments are unlikely, the imposition of legal liability may decrease the supply of future
promises by more than it increases the reliability of promises already made. Such concerns
disappear in a reciprocal context because the increased reliability of a promise is paid for by
the return promise. A promisee can always extract a new promise from a reluctant promisor
by increasing the price he is willing to pay. See id. at 1284-86.
Similarly, tort law continues to deny any obligation to warn, guard, or rescue an imperiled
victim in nonreciprocal contexts because imposing liability may well discourage the supply
of future rescuers (inducing potential rescuers to avoid situations that may call for assistance) by more than it increases the assurance of assistance in those cases where the duty
clearly applies. The special relationship cases are all distinguished by the ability of potential
rescuers and victims to adjust anticipatorily in order to accommodate legal liability. Thus,
the tenant, the bus passenger, or the owner of a complex construction project can overcome
any reluctance by a potential rescuer by offering additional compensation in advance. Id.
12 The doctrine of last clear chance permits either a helpless or an inattentive plaintiff to
recover for negligently caused harm notwithstanding his own contributory negligence. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479-80 (1964). A helpless plaintiff would rarely be found
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would induce an obligor to disclose information which he knows to
be relevant, but it would not encourage the discovery of information necessary for optimal adaptations. Indeed, the imposition of
liability actually discourages investment in the acquisition of infor125
mation that the mitigation principle would otherwise require.
3. An Implied Obligation to Use Best Efforts to Mitigate
Given the complexity and uncertainty characteristic of the relational context, a more elaborate pre-breach mitigation rule that attempts to encourage affirmative adjustments would be ill-suited
for any particular contractual combination. Perhaps the only feasible state-supplied norm, therefore, is a best efforts requirement to
minimize costs whenever a specialized performance makes the
specification of mitigation duties impractical. 26 Under a best efforts duty, both parties will be compensated in advance, through
the contractual allocation of risks and benefits, to undertake all
future adjustments necessary to minimize joint costs. This obligation requires that each party exert the same level of efforts as
in the contract context, but an inattentive plaintiff often would be. Thus, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 480 (1964) provides that an inattentive plaintiff can recover for harm caused
by the defendant's negligence if:
the defendant
(a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realizes or has reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
Id. See also Merrill v. Stringer, 58 N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954); Greear v. Noland Co., 197
Va. 233, 89 S.E.2d 49 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wash. 2d 495, 250 P.2d 546
(1952).
'" See Kronman, supra note 5; Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the
Law of Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117 (1982).
126 Frequently, parties to relational contracts undertake best efforts obligations explicitly,
but such provisions merely confirm the responsibility generally implied by law in the absence of specific agreement. Both common-law courts and the Uniform Commercial Code
thus imply an obligation on a distributor to use best efforts to promote sales in any exclusive dealing arrangement. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917); U.C.C. § 2-306 comment 5 (1978). The vulnerability of a seller who grants an exclusive license to distribute his product justifies a best efforts obligation because the distributor controls the volume of sales. A similar vulnerability exists in the Hadley v. Baxendale
context because neither party can reduce the costs of readjustment contingencies without
information controlled by the other. The law should thus impose a best efforts obligation
whenever a single contractor controls an action or instrumentality necessary to achieve a
cooperative goal. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1114-17.
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would a single firm owning both contractual interests. 2 7 Because
of the difficulty of specifying in advance what that future obligation may entail, however, the parties will face the problem of chiseling. Cases such as Seller's failure to disclose the consequences of
imprecise calibration may not present insoluble enforcement difficulties. The responsibility, however, is not merely one to act on
information already known. Best efforts also implies a duty to invest in discovering exactly what contingencies might occasion the
need for adjustment.
It seems inescapable, therefore, that a best efforts duty to minimize losses requires creative use of an incentive system to reduce
the costs of enforcement. A properly calculated contract price can
encourage a mitigator to consider the obligor's interest in selecting
cost-effective adaptations. 12 Assume, for example, that a best efforts clause requires Buyer to undertake pre-breach mitigation at
Seller's request. The contract further entitles Buyer to a bonus of
fifty percent of the savings if mitigation proves successful. Seller
would thus request adjustments whenever the prospective gains
from adaptation exceed expected costs. Similarly, Buyer would undertake all cost-effective adaptations necessary to earn the maximum bonus. Because Seller's bonus payment is tied to the net savings Buyer achieves, Buyer will make only cost-effective
adaptations.
To enforce a percentage-savings scheme, however, the parties
will need information on costs and resources that may be difficult
to obtain or impractical to monitor. 129 A predetermined fixed bo-

127

See, e.g., Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 396 Pa. 48, 51, 151

A.2d 616, 619 (1959) ("[D]efendants had the duty at least to use such effort as it would have
been prudent to use in their own behalf if they had owned the receivables, or such effort as
it would have been prudent for the plaintiffs to use if they had retained possession of
them."). See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1111-17.
"' See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1105-09.
M The difficulty of monitoring and segregating costs and revenues within multi-product
firms is one such problem. Monitoring the allocation of joint costs or overhead to prevent
such costs from being shifted strategically among various contracts becomes substantially
more expensive. These and other monitoring problems have resulted in widely publicized
failures by actors Fess Parker, James Garner, and Robert Wagner to recover any gains
under putative profit sharing arrangements for seemingly successful television shows such as
"Daniel Boone," "Rockford Files," and "Charlie's Angels." See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1980, at
1, col. 2. The obligor might also pad costs to disguise his true savings and deny any bonus to
the mitigator. Cost padding has many and subtle manifestations that are hard to discover
and still harder to prove.
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nus or penalty, in contrast, would alleviate monitoring problems
while still encouraging appropriate adaptations by both parties.
For example, the parties could set a $1,000 bonus for any successful, pre-breach adjustment performed on request. Because the predetermined bonus or penalty is a fixed sum, each party knows in
advance the consequences of any adjustment option. Each will
thus be encouraged to pool information and then select an efficient
adaptation strategy. 3 0 Furthermore, because the obligor pays for
the adaptations, a modest threat or side payment should discourage opportunistic behavior in most cases.'
Regardless of the care
with which the sum is calculated, however, any fixed-sum payment
scheme designed on average to be appropriate will tend always to
be "wrong" in the particular situation that develops. Post-contractual renegotiations resolving this distortion will be the "error
costs" of fixing the sum.
The importance of specially designed incentive systems in the
relational context supports granting the parties freedom to choose
the arrangement which best serves their contractual purposes.
Courts have increasingly tolerated particularized agreements in
specialized contexts, generally enforcing liquidated damages
clauses, for example, when negotiated between relational contractors.3 2 Failure to identify explicitly the specialized environment as
SO See Cooter, Unity in Torts, Contracts, and Property: The Model of Precaution (unpublished paper 1983) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The fixed
bonus or penalty can be illustrated with an example. Assume that the contract specifies a
$1000 bonus for any pre-breach adjustments successfully adopted. Presumably, the parties
would carefully estimate the amount of the bonus to approach but not equal the gains anticipated from pre-breach adjustments. Under such a contract, Seller would request adjustments whenever the prospective gains from adaptations exceed the amount of the bonus.
Buyer would have the appropriate incentive to supply information and undertake any requested adaptations at the least cost necessary to earn the fixed bonus.
131 If the bonus payment is lower than the costs of mutually beneficial adaptations, the
mitigator will not voluntarily undertake cost-effective adjustments without additional compensation. Alternatively, the performing party will not request cost-effective adjustments
where the benefits are less than the bonus absent a renegotiation. The parties are not required, of course, to select a single incentive payment, but may instead key the amount of
any bonus or penalty to particular contingencies. For instance, the parties can agree to one
bonus for adjustments required because of delay in construction and another for defective
materials. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1099-1100.
132 See, e.g., Pembroke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 454 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1971) (court had no power
to look into reasonableness of liquidated damages provision); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1971) (liquidated damages of 1% of the contract price). But see City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d
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the critical variable, however, invites continuing challenges to such
arrangements despite the more tolerant judicial attitude. 3 3 Liquidated damages agreements continue to be scrutinized under the
common-law requirement that they reasonably estimate the gains
and losses anticipated by the parties. But it may be the very independence of the liquidated damages payment system from objectively assessed losses which motivates both parties to adopt such
provisions. In sum, although the courts have de facto relaxed the
"reasonable forecast" requirement when specialized contracts are
involved, the threat of litigation continues to restrain parties, even
when the actual prospect of invalidating a particular clause may be
quite small.
D. Mitigation and Multiple Breach
The interaction between mitigation and multiple breach is the
final and most complex problem raised in the relational contract
setting. The problem of multiple breach can arise, for example, in
complicated construction projects where parties arrange the various stages of construction to reduce any disruptions caused by unplanned difficulties. Contracts in such situations often assign extra
time, or a "float," to the sequence of individual performances. The
float attached to any single performance is the maximum delay allowed before the delay causes a bottleneck effect, delaying subse458, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974) ($200 per day and $100,000 maximum for delay in completion
of building complex held void as a penalty). The court in City of Rye stated: "The most
serious disappointments in expectation suffered by the city are not pecuniary in nature and
therefore not measurable in monetary damages." Id. at 473, 315 N.E.2d at 458, 358 N.Y.S.2d
at 394. See also Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959); J. Sweet,
Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the Construction Process 400-08 (2d ed.
1977).
113 In view of the general enforceability of liquidated damages clauses in relational contracts, the number of challenges to such provisions under the reasonable estimate criterion
is quite remarkable. In addition to the cases cited supra note 132, see, e.g., United Order of
Am. Bricklayers & Stone Masons Union No. 21 v. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 519 F.2d 331
(7th Cir. 1975); In re Plywood Co., 425 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970); Southwest Eng'g Co. v.
United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Oldis v. Grosse-Rhode, 35 Colo. App. 46,
528 P.2d 944 (1974); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681,
220 A.2d 263 (1966); H.J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A.2d 793 (1947); Norman
v. Durham, 380 S.W.2d 296 (Mo. 1964); Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 73 Misc.
2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Civ. Ct. 1973); Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d
585, 446 P.2d 200 (1968); S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash.
App. 297, 540 P.2d 912 (1975).
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quent performances and, hence, the whole project. If there is no
float available to a performance, that performance is said to be on
the "critical path. 1 3 4 The performance schedule assigns a position
to each subcontractor's performance and is constantly revised
in
35
"critical.'
become
have
sequences
what
determine
order to
Assume that our Buyer initially scheduled his construction project with substantial float allowances for most activities and that,
according to the architect's plan, Seller was about thirty days removed from the critical path. Assume further that modifications
requested by Buyer in the air conditioning system then absorbed
fifteen days of the float and a subsequent additional delay by an
electrical subcontractor placed Seller on the critical path. In other
words, prior delays exhausted the time cushion surrounding
Seller's performance that would have allowed delay without holding up the whole project. Assume finally that Seller delayed his
own performance five days beyond the contract schedule causing
project losses of $25,000. Under these circumstances, the argument
urging nonliability is clear. Earlier parties' use of the float contrib-

'3

The DuPont company developed the critical path scheduling method in cooperation

with Remington Rand between 1956 and 1958. The method proved superior to the conventional bar chart method of scheduling work because it displayed the interrelationships and
interdependence of the various activities controlling the progress of construction. Numerous
public and private construction projects now use the method. See Wickwire & Smith, The
Use of Critical Path Method Techniques in Contract Claims, 7 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (1974).
135 Wickwire and Smith have stated:
[T]he critical path represents the longest chain of interrelated activities (in terms of
time) through the diagram from the beginning to the end of the project. Since this
chain of activities will take the longest to complete, it is "critical" to the completion
of the project.
Basic to the CPM theory is the principle that if one of these 'critical' activities is
delayed by one day, and no pressure is applied to the schedule or critical activity via
resequencing ... or acceleration, the entire project will be delayed. Of course, there
are a great number of other activities which are not on the critical path. These side
paths of activities on the network contain excess time, usually called float or
slack ....
Nonetheless, activities off the critical path are also important since they can become critical to the completion of the project. For example, an activity on a side path,
which is a condition precedent to the commencement or completion of an activity on
the critical path, will become critical when the time taken for a specific activity exceeds both the time allocated for its normal completion and the float time for the
activity. In such circumstances the activity automatically becomes critical since it has
become a restraint to the commencement or completion of the activity upon the critical path.
Id. at 3-5.
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uted substantially to the consequences of delay, and resulting
losses are attributable to these factors.
Resolution of the dispute requires that ownership of the float be
determined. One argument contends that, absent a contrary agreement, the float should be regarded as a management tool available
for the use of every contractor.3 6 This debate over property rights
in the float is typically framed in distributional terms. The prevalence of contract clauses withdrawing a contractor's float rights is
sometimes explained from such distributional viewpoints in terms
of the project owner's alleged bargaining superiority. 137 A more
persuasive explanation for such particularized agreements lies in
the inefficiencies that individual contractor control of the float
would generate. If the float is equally available to every contractor,
then the float will constitute communal property-costless to any

131 This conclusion is principally based on the established custom-particularly in government contracts-that the contractor is entitled to schedule his own work. For example,
in Joseph E. Bennett Co., 72-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9364, at 43,467 n.7 (Mar. 8, 1972), the court
stated:
Those paths that do not lie on the critical path have a certain flexibility in that there
is a difference between the earliest and latest expected times for a particular event.
This difference, called "total float" in CPM, allows the manager latitude in the
scheduling of non-critical activities that originate or terminate at that event, and to
effect trade-offs of resources to shorten or control his project.
Id. at 43,467 n.7. See also Stagg Constr. Co., 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 7914 (Sept. 29, 1969), on
reconsideration, 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
8241 (Apr. 14, 1970); Heat Exchangers, Inc., 1963
B.C.A. (CCH)
3881 (Oct. 8, 1963). But see Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 75-1
B.C.A. (CCH) 11,261 (Apr. 30, 1975), on reconsideration, 76-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 11,649 (Dec.
15, 1975).
137 See Comment, "No Damage" Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 Wash.
L. Rev. 471 (1978). The distributional analysis of such contract clauses is perhaps explained
by the large number of relational contracts to which the government is a party. For an
example of a particularized clause assigning rights in the float to a third party decisionmaker under a time extension mechanism, see recent Post Office and GSA contract
specifications:
Float or slack is defined as the amount of time between the early start date, and the
late start date, or the early finish date and the late finish date, of any of the activities
in the NAS schedule. Float or slack is not time for the exclusive use or benefit of
either the Government or the contractor. Extensions of time for performance required under the Contract General Provisions entitled, "CHANGES," "DIFFERING
SITE CONDITIONS," "TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT-DAMAGES FOR DELAY-TIME EXTENSIONS" or "SUSPENSION OF WORK" will be granted only
to the extent that equitable time adjustments for the activity or activities affected
exceed the total float or slack along the channels involved.
Wickwire & Smith, supra note 134, at 41 n.76.
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one contractor and therefore overused. 138 The costs of delay can be
effectively internalized only by assigning exclusive property rights
in the float to a single contracting party to whom other contractors
are accountable. Thus, allocation of exclusive rights to the owner
(or the general contractor, the architect, or any other single party)
will result in efficient adaptations, the benefits of which can be
shared prospectively at the time of contracting. Furthermore, assuming that the owner (or his agent) generally enjoys a comparative advantage over individual contractors in monitoring the use of
the float, assignment of the rights to him increases their value.' 3 9
Even where a contract or preformulated legal rule clearly assigns
rights in the float, multi-party contracts create a vexing enforcement problem. In the Seller-Buyer construction dispute, for example, three different types of delay to the side path activity exhausted the float. Furthermore, but for the delay of any single
party, the actions of the other two parties would not have resulted
in any actual delay of the project. 4 0 Clearly, Seller should not be
held solely responsible for the delay costs merely because his actions occurred last in time, but difficult problems of proof have
prevented courts from resolving the multiple-breach question. One
way to ameliorate causation problems is to impose a "comparative
negligence" type of liability. For example, courts could require
each subcontractor to bear responsibility proportionate to the
amount of float each consumed. Unfortunately, the comparative
negligence method encounters the same difficulties in its applica-

138

As with any valuable, scarce resource, the absence of exclusive property rights leads to

overconsumption. See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud.
13 (1972).
139 For a detailed discussion of the assignment of property rights among creditors based
on comparative monitoring skills, see Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49 (1982). See also A. Schwartz & R. Scott, supra note 65,
at 560-63 (discussing and critiquing reduced monitoring costs as an explanation for assignment of rights in secured transactions); Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143 (1979) (suggesting a unified theory for how priorities are designated among secured contracts).
140 But see Stagg Constr. Co., 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 7914 (Sept. 29, 1969) (implicitly sanctioning the proportionate responsibility method of government contract disputes), on reconsideration, 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8241 (Apr. 14, 1970); Wickwire & Smith, supra note 134, at
41-42.
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tion here as it does in torts'M and involves substantial difficulties
of proof. 42
An "expected value" liability rule would offer an alternative to
avoid the causation problems of a contributory negligence rule.
Each party using a portion of the float would be assessed a probabilistic liability prospectively for increasing the job's expected cost.
The expected value solution, however, fails as a legal norm because
it requires courts to award liability for a prospective loss that may
never materialize. Even if the loss does materialize, its magnitude
may differ greatly from that predicted by the imposition of liability: the amount of damages assessed in a particular case will always
be wrong in retrospect. Although anticipated costs would provide
correct incentives to the parties, courts may be troubled by the
seeming disproportionality of the prospective measure
of damages
143
retrospectively.
case
the
of
facts
the
viewing
when
No preformulated rule, therefore, can readily solve the multiplebreach problem. This only reemphasizes the importance of particularized incentive systems to encourage appropriate performance.
As indicated previously, 4 4 liquidated damages for construction delay are generally enforceable even where the amount is not an accurate pre-estimate of objective damages.' 5 Thus, parties are free
141

See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory,

80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on
the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982); Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs:
Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. Legal
Stud. 65 (1981).
142 For a discussion of the proof problems of multiple causation disputes from the perspective of statistical decision theory, see Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the

Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982
Am. B. Found. J. 487.
143 For a detailed discussion of the broad-based use of expected value liability in multiple
causation cases in tort law, see Robinson, supra note 141, at 736-67. Professor Kaye argues

that an expected liability rule should rarely be substituted for a preponderance of the evidence standard (maximum likelihood of causing the loss) in cases of a single cause but mul-

tiple defendants. In true multiple causation cases-such as the hypothetical posed here-he
argues that mathematical analysis suggests no preferred rule. Kaye, supra note 142, at 513.
14 See supra text accompanying note 132.
145 The independent decisionmaker can be an architect, arbitrator, or trial judge. See J.
Sweet, supra note 132, at 398-400. A "no-damages-for-delay" clause, withdrawing alternative

remedies for delay, typically accompanies the time extension mechanism. "No Damage"
clauses have been criticized as unconscionable. See Comment, supra note 137. The provision
is better seen as part of a benign strategy for resolving multiple causation problems. Fur-

thermore, the time extension method helps preserve liquidated damages clauses where responsibility is shared by both owner and contractor. See, e.g., Nomellini Constr. Co. v. State
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to contract explicitly for expected damage liability. In the event of
delay, an independent fact-finder could ascertain any increase in
expected losses and assign liability accordingly. Indeed, this is
analogous to the frequently employed time-extension method of allocating responsibility for delay in construction contracts. Under
the time extension technique, all causation questions are referred
to such a fact-finder to distribute the float and grant time extensions accordingly. 146 Nevertheless, these devices require a great
deal of knowledge about the sequence of performance to encourage
appropriate performance without exploitation of the float. A number of factors specific to each contract, including the *size of the
incentive payment and the relative creditworthiness of the parties,
will influence the choice of incentive devices. In this case, for example, a bonus system requires the subcontractors to extend credit
to the owner, while a liquidated damages clause has the opposite
effect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis has dealt with the puzzling divergence between the
cost-minimizing criterion embodied in the mitigation principle and
many of the specific rules of contractual obligation that have
evolved through the common law. An examination of mitigation
rules as part of an interrelated system of contractual obligation
reconciles the apparent incompatibilities. The preformulated rules
which form the network of contractual rights and duties fall into
two distinct categories. The rules governing performance and liability allocate contractual "property rights" by assigning risks to
one party or the other based on presumed advantages in risk-bearing. Changed conditions, however, require cooperative readjustments by both parties if they are efficiently to achieve the original
contractual objective. Rules of mitigation, therefore, authorize an
obligor to conscript the adjustment efforts of the obligee in reducing the cost required to satisfy the original performance obligation.
An inherent tension lurks in any system of rules designed both
to assign risks and encourage cooperative readjustment. This tension influences how parties and the law reduce the theoretical

ex. rel. Department of Water Resources, 19 Cal. App. 3d 240, 96 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1971).
'
See cases cited supra note 132. See also J. Sweet, supra note 132, at 404-08.
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principle of mitigation to actual practice. A well-developed market
for substitute performances substantially lessens the marginal benefits derived from cooperative readjustment. Furthermore, the
market effectively restrains uncooperative behavior whenever mutual adjustments are cost-beneficial. Preformulated mitigation
rules are thus narrowly circumscribed to render the initial performance obligation more definitive and enforceable. In contracts
for specialized performance, however, the absence of a market for
substitutes increases the need for legal rules to encourage cooperative behavior. Although many mitigation rules demonstrate a sensitivity to the market variable, absence of an explicit acknowledgment of its role tends to impose excess uncertainty costs on
contracting parties.
The uncertainty and complexity characteristic of the relational
context prevents the specification of clear rules to guide future behavior. If the law chooses to assist parties in relational environments, it is left with essentially three choices. First, legal rules can
provide clearly articulated general standards of obligation such as
the "best efforts" duty of cooperation in a mutually beneficial enterprise. Second, the legal system can grant wide latitude to individual bargainers in such environments to negotiate particularized
agreements. Finally, the law can develop more specialized norms as
preformulated rules for particular varieties of relational contracts.
Although the doctrine of substantial performance is one example
of judicial willingness to craft rules of limited application, there
are many more complex contractual arrangements susceptible of
predefinition and categorization. Indeed, specialized rulemaking
could be extended to reach the individually tailored arrangement.
One of the explanations for the hesitancy of contracting parties to
craft such creative mechanisms themselves is that individual parties bear the full costs of investing in cost-saving rules, but they
cannot reap the social benefits. Such mechanisms are thus underproduced in the market because the legal system retains the monopoly on meaning and interpretation. An appropriate goal for
contract law may therefore be the development of a legal "dictionary" of clearly defined and understood terms and conditions that
individual bargainers can select without bearing the uncertainty
costs of future interpretation and enforceability.

